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Ambivalence and Activism: 
Employment Discrimination in 
China 
 
Timothy Webster* 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
 Chinese courts have not vigorously enforced many human 
rights, but a recent string of employment discrimination 
lawsuits suggests that, given the appropriate conditions, 
advocacy strategies, and rights at issue, victims can vindicate 
constitutional and statutory rights to equality in court.  
Specifically, carriers of the hepatitis B virus (HBV) have used 
the 2007 Employment Promotion Law to ground legal 
challenges against employers who discriminate against them in 
the hiring process.  Plaintiffs’ relatively high success rate 
suggests official support for making one prevalent form of 
discrimination illegal.  Central to these lawsuits is a broad 
network of lawyers, activists, and scholars who actively support 
plaintiffs, suggesting a limited role for civil society in the world 
of Chinese law.  Although many problems remain with 
employment discrimination, China has made concrete steps 
toward repealing a legal edifice of discrimination that stretches 
back decades and reshaping policies and attitudes to eradicate a 
prevalent form of discrimination, targeting carriers of infectious 
disease. 
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 In 2003, two young college graduates almost got jobs in China’s 
elite civil service.1  Zhou Yichao, handsome and twenty-three years 
old, scored well on both the written test and the oral interview, 
ranking eighth of the 157 applicants.  Zhang Xianzhu, twenty-five 
years old and bespectacled, ranked first among the thirty applicants 
in his hometown.  Both men then took medical examinations, the 
final phase of the Chinese hiring process.  Their medical 
examinations revealed that both men carried the hepatitis B virus 
(HBV), and according to provincial regulations on civil service 
                                                                                                                      
 1. The Los Angeles Times and New York Times both covered these men’s 
sagas. See Joseph Khan, Chinese People’s Republic Is Unfair to Its Short People, N.Y. 
TIMES, May 21, 2004, at A13 (describing the case of Zhang Xianzhu); Ching-Ching Ni, 
Killer Inspires Drive Against Hepatitis Bias, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 8, 2004, at A5 (describing 
the cases of Zhou Yichao and Zhang Xianzhu). 
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examinations, this rendered them ineligible for government posts.  
Both were surprised by this result. 
 Zhou Yichao first contemplated suicide, but upon 
reconsideration, he bought a paring knife, went to the government 
office to ask about the results, and then stabbed two civil servants, 
killing one.  Zhang Xianzhu also took an unexpected course of action.  
He retained a prominent discrimination lawyer and sued the 
government agency for violating his constitutional rights.  Around 
these two cases—the murder trial of Zhou Yichao and the 
administrative litigation initiated by Zhang Xianzhu—a legal 
movement coalesced.  China’s HBV community, which at that point 
consisted of a couple of online chat rooms and discussion boards, 
seized upon these cases to launch a multifaceted campaign to 
introduce antidiscrimination laws, eliminate employment 
discrimination, and change social attitudes more generally.  
Somewhat remarkably, HBV advocates have largely succeeded in the 
first mission, lobbying government bodies to institute legal 
protections.  However, like discriminatory attitudes more generally, 
discrimination by employers remains deeply rooted in contemporary 
China. 
 Since these events unfolded in 2003, advocates have petitioned 
government bodies, conducted campaigns to increase public 
understanding of the actual health risks of HBV, and litigated dozens 
of discrimination lawsuits.  The government’s response has been 
impressive.  In at least three national laws (falü) and six 
administrative regulations (guize), Chinese government bodies have 
addressed the employment rights of disadvantaged Chinese, 
including women, ethnic minorities, the disabled, and carriers of 
infectious diseases (like HBV and AIDS).  Central to the 
government’s various legislative responses has been the careful 
mobilization of the HBV community, which has drafted 
recommendations and petitions to government agencies, sent open 
letters to Chinese government leaders, and commented on draft 
legislation prepared by the national legislature.  This campaign 
opened a discussion about the nature of discrimination in China, as 
well as the role that citizens play in eradicating it. 
 Discrimination is a prevalent but poorly understood social 
problem in China.  The shift from a state-controlled to a market-
based economy in the past thirty years has impacted virtually every 
aspect of Chinese society, from raging economic growth to a floating 
population larger than most countries.  But it has also opened up new 
opportunities for people to assert their free will, whether by 
purchasing new products, enjoying new forms of leisure, or engaging 
in new occupations.  It has also given employers, once bound by the 
diktat of centralized economic planning, considerable autonomy to 
hire, as well as to discriminate in that process. 
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 Of course, discriminatory practices and attitudes do not 
materialize out of thin air.  One of this Article’s primary arguments is 
that the Chinese government—at all levels—plays a leading role in 
promoting discrimination.2  By mandating an earlier retirement age 
for women, as it has done since the early 1950s, the Chinese 
government signals to society that women are frail, merit special 
treatment, and cannot work as hard or as long as men.  Likewise, the 
household registration system (hukou) stamps a person as either 
rural or urban and links his access to social benefits to the locality 
where he is registered.  Given the enormous gap between rich cities 
and poor villages, as well as the difficulty of changing one’s hukou 
status, Chinese villagers face dim job prospects and a thicket of 
municipal restrictions on hiring out-of-towners.  Official barriers also 
remain intact against carriers of infectious diseases.  As seen above, 
civil service positions require applicants to be free of infectious 
diseases, even when the job itself presents no risk of contagion. 
 Facing these policies and social attitudes that reflect distrust 
and disfavor, advocates of various stripes—nongovernmental 
organizations (NGOs), public interest lawyers, concerned citizens, 
government-operated nongovernmental organizations (GONGOs), 
and others—have mobilized to challenge discrimination.  In close 
contact with the media and online channels, these advocates have 
raised awareness, lobbied legislative and administrative bodies to 
repeal discriminatory regulations and pass protective ones, and filed 
dozens of lawsuits claiming employment discrimination.  This Article 
argues that these mobilization efforts, as well as the legislative and 
administrative responses by government bodies, indicate a newfound 
responsiveness of the Chinese government to equal employment, a 
core issue of human rights.  More importantly, the fact that courts 
have routinely found for victims of discrimination suggests that the 
level of commitment is more than merely “discursive,” or paper on the 
books.  Although we can, and will, rightly question the efficacy of 
remedies ordered by Chinese courts, it is clear that officials across 
various sectors of the Chinese government agree that discrimination 
against HBV carriers, if no one else, is worth proscribing. 
                                                                                                                      
 2. The Chinese government is by no means unique in this regard. Over the 
years, the United States federal government and state governments have promulgated 
numerous facially discriminatory laws, from the Chinese Exclusion Act, Pub. L. No. 71, 
22 Stat. 58 (1882) and the Asian Exclusion Act, 43 Stat. 153 (1924), to the Jim Crow 
laws passed in many Southern states. Most recently, a new Arizona law requires law 
enforcement officials to determine the immigration status of any person “where 
reasonable suspicion exists that the person is an alien who is unlawfully present in the 
United States.” Support Our Law Enforcement and Safe Neighborhoods Act, 2010 Ariz. 
Sess. Laws 113, 113. In July 2010, a federal judge blocked this provision of the law, and 
several others, from going into effect. United States v. Arizona, 703 F. Supp. 2d 980, 
987 (D. Ariz. 2010). 
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 This Article proceeds in five parts.  Because the field of 
employment discrimination is so vast, this Article narrows the scope 
by focusing on three large disadvantaged groups: women, migrant 
workers, and carriers of infectious diseases.  Discrimination itself is a 
multifaceted phenomenon.  Therefore, in analyzing the current status 
of discrimination in China and the laws that prohibit it, this Article 
adopts several methodologies, including interviews with lawyers and 
activists involved in discrimination issues, analysis of verdicts 
brought by victims of discrimination, sociological materials on social 
movements, and conventional methods for the excavation and 
interpretation of current (and annulled) Chinese law and regulation.  
An interdisciplinary approach permits reflection both on the nature of 
existing Chinese law and on the processes and people that have led to 
its reformulation and revision. 
Part I briefly describes the historical context for the discussion 
and reviews competing concepts of employment discrimination as 
developed in the West. 
 Part II describes the most common—and perhaps the most 
serious—manifestations of employment discrimination in 
contemporary China.  These manifestations can be overt: job 
advertisements openly express preferences or limitations based on 
gender, health status, age, height, household registration, and so on.  
The prevalence of discriminatory preferences in job advertisements 
reflects both the popularity of discriminatory attitudes and the 
impunity employers enjoy in screening candidates in this manner.  
Alternatively, more covert forms of discrimination are practiced in 
the selection process itself.  Employers deploy a wide range of 
techniques to exclude women, hepatitis B carriers, and other 
disfavored groups (women under 5’2” or over thirty years old; men 
under 5’5” or over thirty-five years old).  Medical examinations, 
photographs, CVs, written examinations, and other “objective” forms 
of documentation provide employers with the pretextual grist needed 
to weed out undesirable applicants.  During the interview itself, 
employers may ask female candidates about their marital status and 
future plans for children.  These processes produce distinctively 
discriminatory workspaces, which are reproduced and normalized in 
factories, stores, and offices. 
 Part III outlines the law of employment discrimination prior to 
the Employment Promotion Law.3  It attends to laws that both 
promote and proscribe discrimination, highlighting the essentially 
ambivalent role that the Chinese government has played in this 
regard.  On the one hand, China has instituted a number of 
discriminatory laws and practices in its sixty-year history.  Women, 
                                                                                                                      
 3. Jiuye Cujin Fa [Employment Promotion Law] (promulgated by the 
Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Aug. 30, 2007, effective Jan. 1, 2008). 
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for instance, must retire before men,4 a form of paternalism perhaps 
plausible in the 1950s, when the regulation was first passed, but no 
longer apposite.5  Likewise, State Council regulations issued in the 
1980s—and still in effect—foreclose job opportunities to infectious 
diseases carriers due to concerns about contagion.6  These restrictions 
sweep broadly and do not accurately reflect the medical risk that 
potential workers may pose to their colleagues and customers.  On 
the other hand, national legislation—such as the Labor Law7 and the 
Women’s Law8—has prohibited discrimination against various 
disadvantaged groups since the early 1990s.  But they have provided 
little legal protection and few remedial opportunities or mechanisms.  
More recent regulations have further sought to entrench the rights of 
migrant workers, with varying degrees of success. 
 Part IV explains how advocates for HBV carriers have effected 
legal change in the area of employment discrimination.  Using 
sociological and political theory, this Part describes how a social 
movement coalesced around the issue of HBV discrimination.  
Spurred by the cases of Zhou Yichao and Zhang Xianzhu, HBV 
advocates have activated a wide range of civil society actors—
carriers, public interest lawyers, concerned citizens, online discussion 
boards, and NGOs—to champion the rights of HBV carriers.  Using 
media pressure and online tools to mobilize public opinion, HBV 
advocates adopted a multipronged strategy to challenge many forms 
of discrimination, including employment discrimination.  By litigating 
cases and encouraging thwarted jobseekers to come forward and sue, 
they frame the struggle as one with deeply human consequences.  
Judges are often sympathetic to the discrimination claims of HBV 
carriers because employment rights are the core socioeconomic rights 
that China claims to privilege.  Activists also petition Chinese 
government bodies to suggest ways to resolve problems with existing 
law, and they point out areas that law should cover.  These various 
strategies have convinced several government agencies to issue 
regulations to protect the rights of roughly 120 million carriers. 
 Part V examines the 2007 Employment Promotion Law and its 
progeny of lawsuits.  The law expands existing legal protections, but 
it also offers victims of employment discrimination a new tool with 
which to challenge discrimination: access to courts.  By suing, 
affected jobseekers can vindicate labor rights that existed almost 
                                                                                                                      
 4. See infra notes 115–25 and accompanying text. 
 5. See infra notes 115, 117, 125. 
 6. See infra notes 213–18 and accompanying text. 
 7. Laodong Fa [Labor Law] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l 
People’s Cong., July 5, 1994, effective Jan. 1, 1995), available at http://www.npc.gov.cn/ 
englishnpc/Law/2007-12/12/content_1383754.htm. 
 8. Funü Quanyi Baozhang Fa [Law on the Protection of Women’s Rights and 
Interests] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Apr. 3, 1992, 
effective Oct. 1, 1992). 
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exclusively as theory or principle for the past two decades.  It is too 
early to decide whether litigation will meaningfully alter the 
practices and attitudes of Chinese employers, but the threat of losing 
a lawsuit may deter some from discriminating against applicants.  
Still, a great deal of work must be done to advance this key human 
right.  Accordingly, the end of this Part offers ways to make the law 
more effective. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A.  Historical Background 
 Throughout its short history, the People’s Republic of China 
(PRC) has always had antidiscrimination law.  The 1954 
Constitution, in a nod to the recently annexed Tibet and Xinjiang, 
guaranteed the right to equality for all ethnic groups: “The People’s 
Republic of China is a unified multiethnic nation.  All ethnicities 
shall be equal.  It is prohibited to discriminate against or oppress any 
ethnicity . . . .”9  This is the sole appearance of the word 
“discriminate” in the 1954 Constitution,10 and one of two in the 
current Constitution,11 but it was not the only provision to address 
discrimination.  Its close correlate, “equality,” also appeared—as it 
has in all four of China’s constitutions—to guarantee equality 
between men and women in the social, political, cultural, and 
educational fields.12  Gender equality has long been a central concern 
for the Chinese government, but it remains an elusive goal to achieve. 
 During the early years of the PRC, women gained traction in the 
fields of culture, education, and employment, but made less progress 
in social rights, and remained largely invisible in the political sphere 
(as they do today).13  In other words, a wide gulf separates the 
                                                                                                                      
 9. XIANFA art. 3 (1954) (emphasis added). 
 10. The 1982 Constitution prohibits discriminating between religious believers 
and non-believers. XIANFA art. 36 (1982). 
 11. Id. art. 4 (“Discrimination against and oppression of any nationality are 
prohibited.”); id. art. 36 (prohibiting discriminating “against citizens who believe in, or 
do not believe in, any religion”). Both provisions remain aspirational. 
 12. See XIANFA art. 48 (1982) (“The state protects women’s rights and interests, 
implements equal pay for equal work between men and women, and cultivates and 
promotes female cadres.”); XIANFA art. 53 (1978) (specifying further the principle of 
equal pay for equal work (tonggong tongchou)); XIANFA art. 27 (1975) (providing that 
women and men enjoy equal rights in all aspects); XIANFA art. 96 (1954) (providing that 
men and women enjoy equal rights in politics, economics, culture, society, family life, 
and all other aspects). 
 13. See Women a Rare Sight in China’s Corridors of Power, ABC NEWS (Oct. 22, 
2007), http://www.abc.net.au/news/stories/2007/10/22/2065608.htm. 
No woman has ever served on the all-powerful Politburo Standing Committee, 
and Ms. Wu [Yi] was the only woman on the outgoing 24-member Politburo, 
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aspirations of equality enshrined in the Chinese Constitution from 
the promotion of equality and proscription of discrimination in 
everyday life.  Moreover, because individuals cannot assert 
constitutional rights,14 the Constitution, without some kind of 
implementing legislation, continues to inspire but not safeguard basic 
rights. 
 In the early days of the PRC, the Chinese government made 
concerted efforts to increase the role and visibility of women in the 
workplace.  The central government issued administrative 
regulations to staff women in fields traditionally dominated by men, 
such as the commercial and service sectors.15  Women were also 
encouraged to enter professions formerly monopolized by men, such 
as tractor drivers, railroad engineers, and pilots.16  In this period, 
women worked in “every sector of the national economy, every 
industry, and every profession, revealing a huge potential labor force 
that had never been recognized or understood by the society or by 
women themselves.”17 
 Under the planned economy, government personnel offices made 
most employment decisions, which filled quotas in line with national 
economic policy.18  If an employee possessed little education, she 
usually was assigned to the same work unit as her parent.19  A more 
educated employee could take an examination for entry into more 
specialized positions like teacher, scientist, or engineer.20 
 At the same time, China also put in place restrictions that, 
however well-intentioned, laid the foundation for today’s 
discriminatory edifices, practices, and attitudes.  The differential 
retirement age for men and women is the leading example of these 
unintended consequences.  Aimed at shortening the time a woman 
had to work in acknowledgement of her role in delivering and rearing 
                                                                                                                      
ranked one notch below the Standing Committee. Before her, just three women 
had been full Politburo members, and all were wives of top leaders, including 
Mao’s wife, Jiang Qing . . . . 
Id. 
 14. ZHOU WEI, XIANFA JIBEN QUANLI SIFA JIUJI YANJIU [STUDIES ON JUDICIAL 
REMEDIES FOR BASIC RIGHTS IN THE CONSTITUTION] 118–19 (2003). Instead, lawyers 
must rely on statutes that implement constitutional protections in order to file cases in 
People’s Courts. Id. at 119. 
 15.  Jiang Yongping, Employment and Chinese Urban Women Under Two 
Systems, in HOLDING UP HALF THE SKY: CHINESE WOMEN PAST, PRESENT & FUTURE 
207, 210 (Tao Jie et al. eds., 2004). 
 16.  Id. 
 17.  Id. at 210–11. 
 18. Yong-Qing Fang et al., National Policy Influence on Women’s Careers in the 
People’s Republic of China, in EMPLOYMENT OF WOMEN IN CHINESE CULTURES: HALF 
THE SKY 49, 51 (Cherlyn Skromme Granrose, ed., 2005) [hereinafter EMPLOYMENT OF 
WOMEN]. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. 
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children, the policy, when initially promulgated in 1957, was seen as 
a boon to women.21  Fifty years later, the policy has come to signify 
something different: that women are somehow less capable or 
suitable than men for both labor and cadre positions.  As a result, 
many women are let go, often forcibly, five to ten years before their 
male counterparts, even if they want to keep working.22 
 Likewise, when instituted in 1958, the household registration 
system (hukou) restricted the movement of all Chinese citizens, 
keeping urban residents in cities and rural residents in the 
countryside.23  Since that time, the Chinese government has 
systematically privileged the development of urban areas over rural 
ones.  Better funded education, transportation, health care, social 
benefits, and other services have made China’s cities much more 
attractive places to live.24  However, because the government 
restricted travel, and made changing one’s hukou status very 
difficult, rural residents were condemned to a lifetime of poverty,25 
enjoying none of the “access to economic and social opportunities, 
activities and benefits” that their urban compatriots enjoyed.26  At 
present, urban residents tend to view rural residents (many of whom 
migrated to the cities for low-end jobs) with a mixture of contempt 
and hostility, while city governments have issued a raft of ordinances 
that privilege local (urban) residents over outside (rural) residents in 
employment, education, and social services.27 
 With the move away from central planning and the opening up of 
the market economy in the 1980s and 1990s, the problem of 
discrimination crept into employment decisions.  No longer firmly 
fixed to their work units, Chinese citizens had greater mobility to 
pursue a broader range of employment opportunities.  Employers, no 
longer bound by centralized hiring decisions, could select whom to 
employ with little outside input.  In this newly emergent space, a host 
of traditional attitudes about women, outsiders, illness, and disability 
resurged.  Stereotyped thinking still retains currency in the minds of 
                                                                                                                      
 21. Ding Hua, Laodong Falü/Zhengce Zhidingzhongde Shehui Xingbie 
Pingdeng Huigu Yanjiu [Review of Gender Equality in Labor Law and Policymaking], 
in XINGBIE PINGDENGDE FALÜ YU ZHENGCE: GUOJI SHIYE YU BENTU SHIJIAN [LAWS & 
POLICIES TOWARDS GENDER EQUALITY: INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES AND LOCAL 
IMPLEMENTATION] 167, 187 (Tan Lin & Du Jie eds., 2008). 
 22. See infra Part III.B. 
 23. FEI-LING WANG, ORGANIZING THROUGH DIVISION & EXCLUSION: CHINA’S 
HUKOU SYSTEM 24 (2005). 
 24. See CONG.-EXEC. COMM’N ON CHINA, CHINA’S HOUSEHOLD REGISTRATION 
SYSTEM: SUSTAINED REFORM NEEDED TO PROTECT CHINA’S RURAL MIGRANTS 2–3 
(2005), http://www.cecc.gov/pages/news/hukou.pdf?PHPSESSID=d7ba37aeb55f864e3c6 
2880ef899d59a (describing how the Chinese government gave benefits to non-
agricultural workers and encouraged movement to urban areas to combat the rural 
labor surplus). 
 25. See infra Part III.B. 
 26. FEI-LING WANG, supra note 23, at 24. 
 27.  See infra notes 165–71 and accompanying text. 
652 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law [Vol. 44:643 
many Chinese and finds analogues across a wide variety of 
government policies and legislation. 
B.  Defining Discrimination 
 Before examining the legal edifices that promote and proscribe 
employment discrimination, some discussion of discrimination itself 
is needed.  Employment discrimination is a complicated phenomenon, 
involving conscious decisions and unconscious assumptions about 
people due to qualities supposedly possessed by virtue of their sex, 
race, national origin, or other immutable characteristics.   
 In the United States, federal courts distinguish direct 
discrimination, also known as disparate treatment, from indirect 
discrimination, or disparate impact.  Direct discrimination—“the 
most easily understood type of discrimination”28—occurs when an 
employer treats a person less favorably than someone else due to a 
protected trait, such as his or her gender, age, or race.29  Indirect 
discrimination is somewhat harder to grasp, as it involves a facially 
neutral practice or policy with “a disproportionately adverse effect on 
minorities.”30  Chinese scholars are fond of citing an 1870 ordinance 
from the San Francisco City Council banning the use of shoulder 
poles (or danbao).31  Although facially neutral, the ordinance clearly 
targeted Chinese immigrants, who retained the use of the pole to 
transport objects in their adoptive homeland.32  
 Finally, systemic discrimination refers to policies or practices 
that have a disproportionately broad impact on a larger 
subpopulation (racial, geographical, professional, or otherwise).33  
This Article argues that the hukou system constitutes the most 
pernicious form of systemic discrimination in contemporary China.  
Systemic discrimination, though developed in the United States and 
other Western societies, is relevant to the structural elements of 
discrimination in the PRC: lopsided development, inequality of 
educational opportunity, and uneven access to social services.  In 
other words, the manifestations and structural causes of 
discrimination travel quite well. 
                                                                                                                      
 28.  Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977). 
 29.  Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2672 (2009) (citing Watson v. Fort 
Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 985–86 (1988)). 
 30.  Id. 
 31.  See, e.g., ZHONGGHUA RENMIN GONGHEGUO JIUYE CUJIN FA JIEDU [AN 
INTERPRETATION OF THE EMPLOYMENT PROMOTION LAW OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF 
CHINA] 70 (Xin Chunying ed., 2007) [hereinafter PROMOTION LAW INTERPRETATION]. 
 32.  Id. 
 33.  See U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, SYSTEMIC TASK FORCE 
REPORT TO THE CHAIR OF THE EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION 1 (2006) 
(defining systemic cases as those which have “‘a broad impact on an industry, 
profession, company, or geographic location’”). 
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 The preceding definitions are particularly important because 
Chinese statutory law, like U.S. statutory law,34 does not define 
discrimination, even as many laws proscribe it.  The lack of a formal 
definition has not hobbled the judicial development of 
antidiscrimination law in the United States, where courts routinely 
step in to fill gaps in legislation by defining discrimination, creating 
judicial mechanisms such as burdens of proof by which to capture 
discriminatory conduct, or prescribing remedies.35  But Chinese 
courts play a far less active role in defining and creating law and 
legal mechanisms.36  Instead, Chinese courts play a more active role 
in the enforcement of existing laws than the creation or critique of 
law and policy.37 
II. CHINESE DISCRIMINATION 
 Chinese scholars identify many types of discrimination in China.  
One Chinese scholar identified over a dozen forms of discrimination 
in employment alone.38  Some of these forms, such as age and 
disability, are similar to recognized forms of discrimination in U.S. 
federal law.39  Others would not properly be considered 
discrimination in the United States, but rather proxies of an 
employee’s abilities, such as academic background, CV, and work 
experience.40  Still others reflect China’s unique socio-political biases, 
                                                                                                                      
 34. See Washington v. Ill. Dep’t of Revenue, 420 F.3d 658, 660 (7th Cir. 2005) 
(“Title VII does not define ‘discrimination’ . . . . Lack of a definition leaves unresolved 
the question how important a difference must be to count as ‘discrimination.’”). 
 35.  See HAROLD S. LEWIS, JR. & ELIZABETH J. NORMAN, EMPLOYMENT 
DISCRIMINATION LAW AND PRACTICE 164–66 (2d ed. 2004) (describing the variety of 
ways in which appellate courts have defined discrimination). 
 36.  See Benjamin L. Liebman, China’s Courts: Restricted Reform, 21 Colum. J. 
Asian L. 1, 32 (2007) (noting the “modest reach of judicial innovation in China”). 
 37.  Of course, the Supreme People’s Court (SPC) can issue judicial 
interpretations (sifa jieshi) of a particular law, which offer guidance to judges applying 
the law. See, e.g., Introduction to China’s Legal System, Law Library of Cong., 
http://www.loc.gov/law/help/china.php (last visited Apr. 8, 2011). But the SPC has 
issued no such document regarding employment discrimination. 
 38.  Lou Yaoxiong, Woguo “Jiuye Qishi” de Fali Fenxi ji Duice [Analysis and 
Countermeasures for the Law of “Employment Discrimination” in China], Beijing 
Youdian Daxue Xuebao (Shehui Kexueban) [J. Beijing U. Posts & Telecomms. (Soc. Sci. 
Ed.)], no. 3, 2004, at 63, 64. 
 39.  Congress made age discrimination illegal by the Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90–202, 81 Stat. 602 (codified as amended at 29 
U.S.C. §§ 621–634 (2006)). Disability discrimination was banned by the Americans 
with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101–336, 104 Stat. 327 (codified as amended 
at 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 12111–12213, 47 U.S.C.A. §§ 225, 611 (West 2011)). 
 40.  Federal law protects against discrimination based on race, color, religion, 
sex, national origin, age, disability, and genetic information. The framework has been 
gradually built up over four decades, from the 1964 Civil Rights Act to the 2008 
Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act. See generally U.S. EQUAL EMP’T 
OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, FEDERAL LAWS PROHIBITING DISCRIMINATION QUESTIONS AND 
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such as region (e.g., antipathy for people from Henan province), 
household registry, and membership in the communist party.41  
Other forms of discrimination reflect concerns about the human body, 
such as height and appearance, or concern over the spread of 
disease.42  To this list one must add categories already protected in 
Chinese national legislation, such as sex, religious belief, race, and 
ethnicity.43 
 Despite this profusion of categories, certain classifications are 
more pernicious than others.  Discrimination based on a person’s 
academic background, CV, and work experience may usefully identify 
talent, giving employers a shortcut to wade through the large number 
of job applicants in China’s crowded job market.  Yet other forms of 
discrimination—such as sex, health status, and household 
registration—serve only to disqualify persons based on outmoded 
thinking and irrational presumptions about the capacity to work 
productively. 
 This Part examines three types of empirical evidence of 
employment discrimination: job advertisements, statistical surveys, 
and personal narratives.  Job advertisements, both in print and 
online, help depict the culture of job recruitment.  Since these ads are 
often the first link in the chain of the hiring process, they are 
particularly valuable indicia of what is permissible and expected of 
applicants.  Advertisements also reveal the expectations and 
preferences that employers bring to bear on their personnel decisions.  
Similarly, statistical surveys about attitudes and experiences of 
discrimination provide an empirical basis to understand which forms 
of discrimination are most widespread.  Different studies arrive at 
divergent conclusions about which forms of discrimination are most 
prevalent, but such divergence may be inevitable whenever 
perceptions, personal experiences, and other subjective forms of 
knowledge are analyzed.  Finally, personal narratives shed additional 
light on the experience of discrimination from the applicant’s 
perspective, while illuminating the techniques used to weed out 
candidates.  Interview questions, e-mail exchanges, requests for 
photographs, and other devices to smoke out “undesirable” job 
candidates may not be captured by statistics or other sources, but 
these techniques are critical to understanding the mechanics of 
employment discrimination in China. 
                                                                                                                      
ANSWERS, http://www.eeoc.gov/facts/qanda.html (last updated Nov. 21, 2009) (listing 
discrimination laws). Presently, Congress is considering extending the same 
protections to sexual orientation. See, e.g., Employment Non-Discrimination Act, 
HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN, http://www.hrc.org/issues/workplace/enda.asp (last updated 
Apr. 8, 2011) (describing the content and current status of the bill). 
 41.  Lou Yaoxiong, supra note 38, at 64. 
 42.  Id. 
 43.  Laodong Fa [Labor Law] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l 
People’s Cong., July 5, 1994, effective Jan. 1, 1995) art. 12. 
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A.  Job Advertisements 
 In the United States and the United Kingdom, critical 
assessment of job advertisements has provided important insights 
into the discriminatory preferences of employers.  In the United 
States, for instance, gender and age discrimination surfaced in 
advertisements throughout the 1980s, even though federal law had 
banned such preferences since the 1960s.44  In one survey, 
researchers found 9.5 percent of advertisements in the classified 
section of various Sunday newspapers to be either “questionable or 
blatantly illegal.”45  Of these discriminatory advertisements, 90 
percent discriminated based on sex, whether for men or women.46  In 
the United Kingdom, researchers noted a decline in the number of 
advertisements with age preferences from 1981 to 1991, suggesting 
that one form of illegal discrimination was on the wane but still 
evident.47 
 More recently, it has become common for U.S. employers to 
counter discriminatory preferences in job advertisements.  Companies 
and organizations now routinely state that they are “Title IX” 
employers, or otherwise encourage applications from women and 
minority candidates.48  Whether this change reflects greater tolerance 
by employers or a heightened recognition of the value (moral, 
economic, or otherwise) of a diverse workforce remains an open 
question.  Alternatively, this greater openness could simply respond 
“to tightened government regulation and threats of lawsuits.”49  
Whatever the underlying reason, a notable shift away from 
discriminatory job advertisements is clearly detectable in the United 
States and United Kingdom. 
 China presents a far different picture, as recent studies show.  
Zhihong Gao’s study of online recruiting50 and Zhou Wei’s research on 
                                                                                                                      
 44.  John P. Kohl et al., The Ongoing Battle of Discrimination in Help Wanted 
Ads, 15 BUS. FORUM 8, 9 (1990). 
 45.  Id. at 10. 
 46.  Id. at 11. 
 47.  Ann E. McGoldrick & James Arrowsmith, Recruitment Advertising: 
Discrimination on the Basis of Age, 15 EMP. REL. 54, 55 (1993). 
 48.  See, e.g., Recruiting and Hiring Policy, VANDERBILT UNIV. (Sept. 1, 2009), 
http://hr.vanderbilt.edu/POLICIES/hr-017.pdf. 
Vanderbilt University and Medical Center are committed to ensuring equal 
employment opportunities. In compliance with federal law, including the 
provisions of TITLE IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, Sections 503 
and 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, and the Americans with Disabilities 
Act of 1990, Vanderbilt University does not discriminate . . . . 
Id. 
 49.  Zhihong Gao, Gender Discrimination in Chinese Recruitment 
Advertisements: A Content Analysis, 9 J. ASIA-PAC. BUS. 395, 404 (2008). 
 50.  Id. 
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print advertisement51 suggest that age, gender, and physical 
appearance remain critical criteria for employers.  Other factors, such 
as household registration and height, appear less frequently than age 
and gender, instead surfacing in more specialized or exotic 
positions.52  Many advertisements contained multiple forms of 
discrimination—women under the age of thirty, men over 5’5”—so 
these categories should not be thought of in isolation.53 
 Gao surveyed 955 white-collar job advertisements on 
ChinaHR.com, a leading employment website.54  She found that the 
most frequently cited discriminatory basis was age, which appeared 
in 24.2 percent of the ads, followed by gender (12.3 percent), and 
physical appearance (10.5 percent).55  Further deconstruction of the 
categories led to interesting, if predictable, results.  For example, 
gender restrictions targeted both men (5.5 percent) and women (6.7 
percent); most of the former were for managerial positions, while 
most of the latter were for sales and clerical positions.56  These 
advertisements reinforce the traditional power structure that 
subordinates women to men.  Moreover, many ads for women 
contained other restrictions, such as age (typically under thirty) and 
appearance (“‘good looking,’ ‘having a nice image,’ ‘tall enough’”).57  
This multiplicity of restrictions suggests “a more demeaning 
dimension to gender discrimination” in China, namely that Chinese 
women “are treated . . . as sex objects . . . to please the eyes of male 
bosses and clients.”58 
 Other surveys of China’s advertising reveal that age and gender 
weigh heavily on employers’ minds.  One study surveyed 568 firms 
across eight different job sectors, including goods and manufacturing, 
research and development, commerce and logistics, finance and public 
finance, and administrative and personnel.59  To ensure a broad 
                                                                                                                      
 51.  Ning Xueling & Zhao Tieshan, 1995-2005-nian Shanghaishi he Chengdushi 
Baokan Guanggao Yaoqiu Laodongzhe yu Gangwei Zhize Wuguande Tiaojian Tubiao 
[Charts on Conditions Irrelevant to Professional Responsibilities of Laborers and 
Positions Sought in Shanghai and Chengdu Print Job Advertisements from 1995 to 
2005], in FANQISHIFA YANJIU: LIFA LILUN YU ANLI [STUDIES ON ANTIDISCRIMINATION 
LAW: LEGISLATION, THEORY & CASES] 338 (Zhou Wei ed., 2008). 
 52.  Id. at 369, 390. Ning and Zhao surveyed 242,520 advertisements from four 
newspapers (two in Shanghai, two in Chengdu) over a ten-year period. Id. at 338–39, 
345. Age, academic background, and work experience were among the most prevalent 
preferences that appeared in print. On the other hand, height restrictions appeared in 
3.4 percent of the advertisements, while household registration restrictions appeared 
in 7.8 percent. Id. at 369, 390. 
 53.  Id. at 347. 
 54.  Zhihong Gao, supra note 49, at 405. 
 55.  Id. at 406–07. 
 56.  Id. at 407. 
 57.  Id. at 411. 
 58.  Id. 
 59.  See Zhu Aisheng, Sun Weixiang & Zhao Butong, Zhaopinzhong Qishi 
Xianxiangde Shizheng Yanjiu [An Empirical Study of Discriminatory Phenomena in 
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snapshot of discrimination, the authors surveyed state-owned 
enterprises, collective enterprises, privately owned companies, foreign 
invested companies, and shareholding companies.60  Again, age was 
the preeminent factor, appearing in 54.4 percent of the 
advertisements examined.61  Among the more discriminatory sectors 
were finance, administration and personnel, and commerce and 
logistics; in these sectors, over half of the advertisements contained 
age restrictions, targeting candidates who were either eighteen to 
twenty years old or, somewhat more commonly, twenty-five to thirty-
five years old.62  By contrast, few employers specifically targeted 
persons aged thirty-five to forty-five years old or forty-five and over.63 
 Gender was a less prominent factor than age, but the use of 
gender varied considerably across sectors.  Certain sectors preferred 
men.  Twenty-two percent of the advertisements in production 
required men, while only four percent required women.64  Research 
and development was similarly skewed: 14 percent required men, 
while only 2 percent required women.65  Commerce and logistics 
likewise favored men by a ratio of 28 percent to 6 percent.66  
However, other sectors sought women:  administrative and personnel 
preferred women by a ratio of 31 percent to 8 percent, and education 
and hygiene preferred women by a ratio of 30 percent to 6 percent.67  
These statistics certainly support the idea that men are preferred in 
industries that require physical labor or scientific skills, while women 
are valued for administrative skills or ability to teach. 
 Although somewhat less prevalent than age or gender, hukou 
status also matters to many employers.  Statistical evidence is 
limited, but one survey of Chongqing showed that only 7 percent of 
positions contained hukou restrictions, but that over 20 percent of 
employers restricted labor in this way.68  The author of the survey 
conducted phone interviews with twenty of the employers that 
                                                                                                                      
Recruitment], 20 SHENGCHANLI YANJIU [STUD. ON PRODUCTION] 74, 74 (2007) (including 
slashes in the categories themselves). 
 60. Id. 
 61.  Id. 
 62.  Id. Several of the bases discussed in this Article—such as academic 
background, professional title, or work experience—would not constitute discrimination 
under U.S. law. This reveals an important difference in American and Chinese 
conceptions of discrimination.   
 63.  Id. 
 64.  Id. 
 65.  Id. 
 66.  Id. 
 67.  Id. 
68.  Yuan Weiqin, Chongqing Wailai Wugong Jiuye Qishi Diaocha [Survey of 
Employment Discrimination Against Chongqing’s Outside Workers], in JINZHI JIUYE 
QISHIDE FALÜ ZHIDU YU ZHONGGUODE XIANSHI [LEGAL SYSTEMS OF ANTI-
DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT & CHINA’S REALITY] 171, 183–84 (Zhou Wei et al. 
eds., 2008) (presenting research that indicates 683 of 9,606 positions contained such 
restrictions, while 142 employers out of 683 implemented such restrictions). 
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included these restrictions.  When asked why they discriminated 
against outsiders, the employers’ responses included: (1) “We don’t 
know what to make of outside laborers; we do not know if they are 
thieves or hooligans”; (2) “We have never hired outsiders, nor thought 
to hire them”; (3) outsiders require a certain period of time to 
acclimate to Chongqing; and (4) “Outsiders’ habits are different from 
ours. . . . We hired one before, but he was stubborn as a mule.”69  
Whether based on ignorance or limited experience, the prevailing 
attitudes in at least one of China’s metropolitan areas suggest a deep 
prejudice toward outside labor. 
 A culture of discrimination has congealed at the first step of the 
Chinese hiring process, presaging a process replete with 
discrimination.  Little wonder that workspaces in China are so clearly 
gendered, with men occupying posts at the managerial levels and 
women suffusing the lower rungs of the service sector.70  Although 
the evidence is more limited, negative attitudes toward “outsiders” 
(Chinese citizens with non-local residency status) likewise 
characterize many employers.  If China seriously intends to be rid of 
employment discrimination, some effort must be made to end 
discriminatory advertisements, which both naturalize and reproduce 
artificially segregated workspaces. 
B.  Statistics 
 Statistical surveys provide another glimpse at the problem of 
employment discrimination.  Surveys usefully reflect both reality 
(which groups work at what levels of society) and perceptions of 
reality (have you ever been discriminated against?).  Both reality and 
its perception are critical in understanding discrimination because of 
the important role that perception plays in perpetuating 
discrimination. 
 In May 2006, scholars at China University of Political Science 
and Law interviewed 3,500 people about their attitudes and 
experiences with discrimination in ten large cities: Beijing, 
Guangzhou, Nanjing, Wuhan, Shenyang, Xi’an, Chengdu, Zhengzhou, 
Yinchuan, and Qingdao.71  The results provide a relatively 
                                                                                                                      
 69.  Id. at 185. 
 70. Given the Chinese preference for numerical slogans, it is no surprise that 
scholars have described this phenomenon as “the three manys and the three fews.” 
Namely, “many deputies, but few executives; many low-level workers, few high-level 
workers; many idle, few busy.” See generally Yi Xiaorong, Zhongguo Funü Quanyi 
Baohu Tanwei: yi Falü Yuanyuan wei Shijiao [A Micro-Exploration of the Protection of 
Chinese Women’s Rights and Interests: From the Perspective of Legal Sources], in 
SHEHUI XINGBIE PINGDENG YU FALÜ: YANJIU HE DUICE [GENDER EQUALITY AND LAW: 
RESEARCH AND SOLUTIONS] 17, 22 (Jia Lin & Jiang Xiuhua eds., 2007) [hereinafter 
GENDER EQUALITY]. 
 71.  Zhongguo Zhengfa Daxue Xianzheng Yanjiusuo [Constitution Research Ctr. 
of the China Univ. of Politics and Law], Zhongguo Shida Chengshi Jiuye Qishi 
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comprehensive picture of the circumstances of discrimination in 
today’s China. 
 When asked if there is discrimination in employment today, 85.5 
percent responded affirmatively, while 50.8 percent of respondents 
believed that discrimination was “extremely severe.”72  A mere 6.6 
percent replied that there was no discrimination.73  Similarly, a 
majority of respondents (54.9 percent) believed that they had 
personally experienced some kind of discrimination in the hiring 
process,74 and almost one-sixth (15.7 percent) of respondents had 
experienced “very severe” or “relatively severe” discrimination.75 
 Further breakdown of the types of discrimination is also 
revealing.  According to 62.6 percent of respondents, the most 
common form of discrimination is academic discrimination, meaning 
that the employer overemphasizes a candidate’s academic 
background or that the educational requirement exceeds the actual 
necessities of the job.76  Health discrimination came in second at 47.7 
percent, followed by appearance (36.7 percent), age (32.9 percent), 
household registration status (28.7 percent), and finally sex (21 
percent).77  Although this study did not find that sex discrimination is 
a particularly widespread strain of employment discrimination, other 
studies have concluded otherwise.  For instance, in a survey 
conducted by the Women’s Federation of Jiangsu Province, 80 percent 
of female college students had been rejected for a position due to their 
gender, and over one-third of these women had multiple rejections of 
this sort.78 
 Likewise, the China Women’s Federation, together with the 
National Bureau of Statistics, conducted national surveys on women’s 
employment and social status in 1990 and 2000.79  Over the course of 
that decade, employment rates for men and women dropped, but the 
decline was steeper for women.80  In 1990, 90 percent of men were 
employed, but that number fell to 81.5 percent in 2000 (constituting a 
                                                                                                                      
Zhuangkuang Wenjuan Diaocha [Questionnaire Survey on the Situation of Employment 
Discrimination in Ten Large Chinese Cities], in ZHONGGUO JIUYE QISHI XIANZHUANG JI 
FANJIUYE DUIXIANG [EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION IN CHINA: CURRENT CONDITIONS 
AND ANTI-DISCRIMINATION STRATEGIES] 505 (Cai Dingjian ed., 2007) [hereinafter 
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION IN CHINA]. 
 72.  Id.  
 73.  Id. 
 74.  Id. 
 75.  Id. 
 76.  Id.  
 77.  Id.  
 78.  Zhang Lixia, Shilun Woguo Funü Jiuyequande Falü Baohu [Theorizing 
Legal Protection of Chinese Women’s Employment Rights], HENAN DAXUE XUEBAO 
(SHEHUI KEXUEBAN) [HENAN U. J. (SOC. SCI. ED.)], Jan. 2004, at 104 & n.2. 
 79.  Yi Xiaorong, supra note 70, at 22. 
 80.  See Jiang Yongping, Presentation on the Situation of Chinese Gender 
Equality and Gender Equality Promotion Policies (PowerPoint on file with author). 
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9 percent decrease).81  By comparison, 76.3 percent of women were 
employed in 1990, but that number fell to 63.7 percent in 2000 
(representing a 13 percent decrease).82  For young and middle-aged 
urban women, the employment rate dropped from 80 percent to 72 
percent.83  Women also accounted for a larger proportion of those laid 
off (56 percent), even though they make up a minority of the work 
force.84 
 Local surveys also indicate the relative absence of women in 
positions of leadership.  Hebei Province, for example, conducted a 
survey of government employment in 1994.85  The percentage of 
women in high-level management positions—whether in government 
enterprises, agencies, or institutions—was well below 1 percent.86  A 
more recent survey found that only 4.1 percent of top leaders in 
government were women.87 
 The situation is not much better for carriers of infectious disease, 
especially China’s 120 million HBV carriers.  Yirenping, a leading 
NGO that advocates on behalf of people with HBV, has recently 
surveyed the hiring practices of multinational corporations with 
offices in China.88  According to a 2006 survey, 77 percent of 
multinational corporations claimed that they would refuse applicants 
carrying HBV.89  Two years later, the same survey found that (a) 84 
percent of multinationals still require job applicants to take physical 
examinations and submit the results, and (b) 44 percent would still 
turn down applicants who tested positive.90  The 33 percent decrease 
from 2006 to 2008 is a positive development, but the fact that 44 
percent would still discriminate, even though such discrimination is 
now clearly illegal after the 2007 Employment Promotion Law,91 is 
surprising.  It suggests, among other things, that foreign corporations 
are either unaware of legal developments in Chinese labor law or 
unconcerned about their consequences.92   
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 82. Id. 
 83.  Yi Xiaorong, supra note 70, at 22. 
 84.  Id. 
 85.  Yong-Qing Fang, Women’s Development in Hebei Province, PRC, in 
EMPLOYMENT OF WOMEN, supra note 18, at 157, 157. 
 86.  Id. at 162. 
 87.  Yong-Qing Fang et al., supra note 18, at 65 (citing a 2003 survey). 
 88.  Discrimination Against Hepatitis B Carriers Rising—Survey, CHINA DAILY, 
Mar. 5, 2009, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2009-03/05/content_7542374.htm. 
 89.  Id. 
 90.  Id. The second survey was conducted from October to December of 2008. Id. 
 91.  See Jiuye Cujin Fa [Employment Promotion Law] (promulgated by the 
Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Aug. 30, 2007) art. 30 (banning discrimination 
against carriers of infectious diseases). 
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 Likewise, scholars have conducted independent research on 
various subpopulations in China.  Ye Jingyi and Shi Yuxiao surveyed 
carriers of the hepatitis B virus about their experiences with 
employment discrimination.93  Over half of the respondents (52.3 
percent) claimed that they had been refused a job.94  Of these people, 
72.3 percent claimed they were denied the job because they failed to 
pass a physical examination,95 while only 11.7 percent believed the 
denial was for another reason.96  Over half of respondents (56.3 
percent) claimed to have experienced some form of discrimination 
while on the job, while almost one-third (32 percent) had been fired at 
one time.97  In this last category, over 70 percent of respondents 
claimed that their employers told them the truth—that they were 
fired because they carried the hepatitis B virus—while 18.8 percent 
said their employer used an excuse to terminate them.98 
 Statistics offer another window into the realities of employment 
discrimination, illuminating the experiences of employees and 
applicants, as well as the attitudes and perceptions of employers and 
society at large.  A degree of subjectivity infuses many of these 
surveys, reflecting the nature of discrimination itself.  The experience 
of discrimination presumably involves subjective determinations by 
job applicants who feel discriminated against, particularly if the 
reason for their refusal is never explicitly stated, but it also 
presumably includes conscious and unconscious discrimination by 
employers, who may be unaware of their own biases.  Still, the 
surveys make clear that discrimination (perceived and otherwise) is 
widespread, affecting various groups of people. 
C.  Personal Experiences 
 Although unverifiable through statistical means or numerical 
measures, anecdotal experience rounds out the portrait of 
                                                                                                                      
and Employment Promotion Law in November and December 2007. Three of the eighty 
questions concerned employment discrimination. Wubumen Lianhe Juban Laodong 
Hetong Fa he Jiuye Cujin Fa Zhishi Jingsai [Five Bureaus Unite to Conduct a 
Knowledge Competition on the Labor Contract Law and the Employment Promotion 
Law], LAODONG BAOZHANGBU WANGZHAN [DEP’T OF LABOR & SOC. SEC.] (Nov. 11, 
2007), http://www.gov.cn/gzdt/2007-11/05/content_796320.htm. 
 93.  Ye Jingyi & Shi Yuxiao, You Canji Qishi Dao Jiankang Qishi [From 
Disability Discrimination to Health Discrimination], in JINZHI JIUYE QISHI: GUOJI 
BIAOZHUN HE GUONEI SHIJIAN [EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION: INTERNATIONAL 
STANDARDS & NATIONAL PRACTICE] 318–19 (Li Weiwei & Lisa Stearns eds., 2006). 
 94.  Id. 
 95. Id. The Chinese hiring process typically involves three examinations. If one 
passes the written examination, she may then be invited for an oral examination. If 
successful at this stage, the candidate then must typically go for a physical 
examination at a nearby hospital.  
 96.  Id. at 319. 
 97.  Id. 
 98. Id. 
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discrimination.  Personal narratives convey three related themes.  
First, they bring to light actual techniques used by employers to 
exclude qualified candidates.  Second, when repeated across time and 
space, anecdotal experience illuminates which forms of discrimination 
are most prevalent.  Third, and with the first two factors in mind, 
such narratives can guide discussions of ways to stop discrimination 
in the workplace.  For example, if employers can pose personal 
questions to female job applicants during an interview—about 
marital status, boyfriends, plans to have children, and so on—women 
face a substantial barrier to securing employment.  Although dozens 
of anecdotes portray the actualities of hiring, two in particular shed 
light on the techniques used to weed out women. 
 First, a female job applicant e-mailed her résumé to a 
company.99  She did not indicate her sex on the application, and she 
did not include a photograph, a common accompaniment of many job 
applications in China.  The employer called her the next morning, 
telling her that she did not include a photograph.  The applicant 
offered to send one off right away, but the employer stalled, saying 
they still wanted to “research other applications.”  She never heard 
back from the company, but she believes that the company liked her 
résumé.  Upon realizing she was female—as they could determine 
through the phone call—they lost interest.  The authors of the study 
from which this anecdote is drawn suggest that this technique is 
commonly used to ferret out female candidates, and that it 
constitutes a form of sex discrimination.100 
 Second, a female law graduate described her classmate’s 
interview with a small company.101  The interview centered around 
three questions: “Are you married?”; “Do you have a boyfriend?”; and 
“How much do you want for a salary?”102  Interviewers frequently 
question women about childcare or pregnancy (planned or past), 
questions that would be illegal under U.S. law.103  They either ask 
these questions directly or ask if the applicant would be willing to 
                                                                                                                      
 99. Tong Xin & Liang Meng, Tamen Weihe Chenmo: Nüdaxuesheng Zai Qiuzhi 
Guochengzhong Suozaoshoude Xingbie Qishi Yanjiu [Why Do They Keep Silent: 
Research on the Gender Discrimination Encountered by Female College Graduates in 
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move around to different cities with the job; if the applicant is 
unwilling to move, the employer will ask if she has a boyfriend.104  
 Although this may seem like an unwelcome intrusion into the 
applicant’s personal life, employers are not simply being nosy.  
Because employers typically pay for the ninety days of maternity 
leave required by the Labor Law, many profit-minded employers 
would prefer to avoid this liability altogether.105  Therefore, the 
extirpation of discrimination against women will likely require a 
change in thinking about responsibilities for child care (a normative 
matter) and the reallocation of the costs of providing maternity leave 
and child care (a policy matter). 
 With some understanding of the manifestations of employment 
discrimination and a basic grasp of their underlying rationales, Part 
III turns to the laws that both proscribe and promote discrimination. 
III. THE LAW OF EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 
A.  Antidiscrimination Law 
 In the 1990s, Chinese law began to guarantee equal rights in 
employment.  The 1990 Law to Protect Disabled Persons mandated 
that “[n]o discrimination shall be practiced against disabled persons 
in recruitment, employment, obtaining permanent status, technical 
or professional titles, payment,” and other areas.106  The 1992 Law on 
the Protection of Rights and Interests of Women (Women’s Law) first 
extended protections to women in numerous areas of employment, 
including hiring and firing; titles, promotions, and salaries; and 
marriage, pregnancy, and nursing.107  Likewise, the 1994 Labor Law 
ensured that workers “regardless of their ethnic group, race, sex, or 
religious belief, shall not be discriminated against in employment.”108  
Despite these provisions, however, employers could discriminate with 
impunity against any protected class because the mechanisms to 
implement these laws were either weak or nonexistent.109  Unlike the 
                                                                                                                      
 104.  Tong Xin & Liu Meng, supra note 99, at 254. 
 105.  See Laodong Fa [Labor Law] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l 
People’s Cong., July 5, 1994, effective Jan. 1, 1995) art. 62 (“Female staff and workers 
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(promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Dec. 28, 1990, effective May 
15, 1991) art. 34. 
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protection during menstrual period, pregnancy, obstetrical period and nursing period”). 
 108.  Labor Law art. 12. 
 109.  EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION IN CHINA, supra note 71, at 39. 
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United States, China does not have an Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission to investigate allegations of employment 
discrimination.  Moreover, China lacks implementing regulations or 
judicial interpretations that tell courts how to handle employment 
discrimination claims or remedy successfully litigated claims.110  
Indeed, some courts refuse to accept employment discrimination 
claims on the grounds that they are not listed in the Regulation on 
the Causes of Action for Civil Cases, issued by the Supreme People’s 
Court.111 
 In summary, before the passage of the Employment Promotion 
Law (EPL) in 2007, Chinese law proscribed employment 
discrimination but offered very little by way of remediation.  Before 
turning to the impact of the EPL, however, it is first necessary to 
examine the obverse of Chinese antidiscrimination law: laws 
promoting discrimination. 
B.  Discriminatory Laws and Their Repeal 
 The Chinese government, both at the central and local levels, 
has promulgated a number of laws, regulations, and ordinances that 
exclude persons from certain jobs, force women to retire early, or 
otherwise disadvantage certain applicants based on immutable 
characteristics.  State-sponsored discrimination both naturalizes 
discriminatory practices and perpetuates the marginalization of 
various groups outside the power structures of Chinese society.  The 
continued development of antidiscrimination law requires a careful 
review of the underlying rationales for discriminatory laws, a 
comparison of these rationales with contemporary realities, and a 
decision as to whether amendment or withdrawal may be 
appropriate.  Many policies developed in the 1950s—when the PRC 
was a new country inculcating a revolutionary spirit in its people—no 
longer match contemporary realities.  In some instances, the 
government has already responded with appropriate changes, often 
after sustained pressure from the public, petition drives, and media 
scrutiny.  This work should continue, either through incremental 
revisions or by passing an all-encompassing antidiscrimination 
law.112  This Part outlines some of the major laws and policies that 
promote discrimination based on gender, hukou status, and infectious 
disease.  It then discusses recent changes or revisions to these 
discriminatory laws and policies. 
                                                                                                                      
 110.  Interview with Liu Minghui, Professor, China Women’s College (Mar. 18, 
2009). Other courts have, of course, accepted such cases as falling within the “other 
torts” category. 
 111.  Id. 
 112. Scholar Zhou Wei has drafted a comprehensive antidiscrimination law (on 
file with author). 
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1A.  Gender Discrimination 
 A number of Chinese laws promote employment discrimination 
against women.  The most widely cited is the differential retirement 
age, which mandates that women must retire before men.  In 1958, 
China’s highest executive body, the State Council, issued Temporary 
Guidelines Handling the Retirement of Workers and Professionals, 
which initially set the differential retirement ages.113  Although these 
“temporary” guidelines were withdrawn in 2001, other State Council 
Guidelines from the 1970s propagated this practice into the 
present.114 
 Differential retirement ages may have made sense in the 1950s.  
Under the influence of the Soviet Union, and with a mind toward 
protecting women, not inhibiting gender equality, China passed a 
differential retirement age for men and women.115  Because women 
needed time for maternity leave, maternal protections, and raising 
children, it was “reasonable” for them to work less and retire 
earlier.116  In the immediate post-revolutionary period, traditional 
notions about the division of labor still prevailed, despite some 
revolutionary stirrings about the proper role of women.117  In 
practice, however, during that period women handled more of the 
domestic responsibilities, and men provided for the family through 
outside work.118 
                                                                                                                      
 113.  Guowuyuan Guanyu Gongren, Zhiyuan Tuixiu Chuli de Zanxing Guiding 
[State Council’s Temporary Guidelines Handling the Retirement of Workers and 
Professionals] (promulgated Nov. 16, 1957, withdrawn Oct. 6, 2001) art. 2. Article 2(1) 
set the retirement age for male workers and professionals at 60 years, female workers 
at 50 years, and female professionals at 55 years. In addition, for particularly laborious 
work, such as jobs at high altitudes or high temperatures, the retirement age for men 
was 55 years, and 45 years for women. Id. art. 2(2). 
 114.  See infra notes 120–21 and accompanying text. 
 115.  Peng Xizhe, Yunyong Shehui Zhengce Gongju Tuijin Shehui Xingbie 
Pingdeng: Yi dui Zhongguo Yanglao Zhidude Fenxi Weili [Using Social Policy Tools to 
Promote Gender Equality], in GENDER EQUALITY, supra note 70, at 27, 34. 
 116.  See Laodongbu Bangongting, Guowuyuan Renshiju, Quanguo Zonggonggui 
Laodong Baoxianbu Guanyu Gongren, Zhiyuan Tuixiu Chuli Zanxing Guidingde Wenti 
Jieda [Answers to Questions on Temporary Regulations Related to Handling the 
Retirement of Workers and Professionals from the General Office of the Ministry of 
Labor, the Bureau of Personnel of the State Council, and the Labor Insurance 
Department of the National Federation of Trade Unions], as cited in Chen Weimin & Li 
Ying, Tuixiu Nianling Dui Zhongguo Chengzhen Zhigong Yanglaojin Xingbie Chayide 
Yingxiang Fenxi [An Analysis of the Influence of the Retirement Age on Gender 
Differences in Pensions of Chinese Urban Workers and Professionals], in GENDER 
EQUALITY, supra note 70, at 39, 45. 
 117.  See Chen Weimin & Li Ying, Tuixiu Nianling Dui Zhongguo Chengzhen 
Zhigong Yanglaojin Xingbie Chayide Yingxiang Fenxi [An Analysis of the Influence of 
the Reitrement Age on Gender Differences in Pensions of Chinese Urban Workers and 
Professionals], in GENDER EQUALITY, supra note 70, at 39, 45 (describing the rationale 
for a post-revolutionary law on women’s retirement age).   
 118.  Feng Yuan, Cong Tongling Tuixiude Zhenglun Kan Gonggong Zhengcede 
Juece Guocheng [Looking at Decisional Process in Public Policy from the Point of View 
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 A generation later, in 1978, the State Council issued another set 
of “temporary” guidelines, both of which mandated differential 
retirement ages and remain in effect: the Temporary Measures on the 
Retirement and Resignation of Workers (Workers’ Measures) and the 
Temporary Measures on the Proper Arrangement of the Elderly, 
Weak, Infirm and Disabled Cadres (Cadres’ Measures).119  The 
Workers’ Measures provide that “Workers in state-owned enterprises, 
institutional units, government or [communist] party organs, or mass 
organizations must retire upon reaching any of the following 
conditions: (1) males reaching 60 years, and females reaching 50 
years, after they have worked continuously for ten years.”120  The 
Cadres’ Measures, on the other hand, provide that “Cadres working 
in party or government organs, mass organizations, enterprises or 
institutional units can retire upon reaching any of the following 
conditions: (1) males reaching 60 years, and females reaching 55 
years, after they have participated in revolutionary work for ten 
years.”121  In other words, the retirement age for men is sixty 
whether they are cadres or workers, whereas female cadres must 
retire at fifty-five and female workers at fifty.  It is important to note 
that private companies are not bound by either directive, although 
they frequently force women to retire before men.122 
 By law, then, many female professionals are let go upon reaching 
the age of fifty-five.  But many female professionals have been 
misclassified as workers, either because they were wrongly classified 
when they began their jobs in the 1980s, or because they have 
elevated to professional status over the course of their careers.123  
Doctors, teachers, accountants, journalists, health care professionals, 
and many others are fired at the age of fifty.124  Moreover, when they 
sue in court, or pursue labor arbitration, these women face 
                                                                                                                      
of the Controversy on Retiring at the Same Age], in GENDER EQUALITY, supra note 70, at 
61, 62. 
 119.  See infra notes 120–21. 
 120.  Guowuyuan Guanyu Gongren Tuixiu, Tuizhide Zanxing Banfa [State 
Council’s Interim Procedures on the Retirement and Resignation of Workers] (June 13, 
1978) (emphasis added), available at http://law.cctv.com/program/xyh/topic/C195 
62/20071017/104947.shtml. 
 121.  Guowuyuan Guanyu Anzhi Laoruobingcan Ganbude Zanxing Banfa [State 
Council’s Interim Measures on the Proper Arrangement of the Elderly, Weak, Infirm 
and Disabled Cadres] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., June 
2, 1978) (emphasis added). 
 122.  Interview with Guo Huimin, Professor, Northwest Polytechnical Univ., 
Sept. 22, 2009. Professor Guo explained that women may make more money from social 
security than from their working wage. From the company’s perspective, replacing 
older employees with younger ones can significantly lower payroll expenditures.  
 123.  GUO JIANMEI, WOMEN WATCH—CHINA, CASE STUDIES OF EARLY 
RETIREMENT OF FEMALE PROFESSIONAL & TECHNICAL PERSONNEL IN CHINA 3 (2008). 
 124.  Id. at 3. 
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insurmountable obstacles, often because the decision to fire them is 
authorized by local government policy.125 
 Differential age restrictions harm women in several ways.  First, 
for many women, their professional lives may only begin to blossom 
at age fifty, particularly if they deferred professional commitments to 
raise children, obtain advanced degrees, or both.  To require women 
to retire at fifty-five, five years before their male counterparts, 
nullifies a lifetime of toil, trouble, and deferred gratification. 
 Second, retirement pensions are tied directly to the number of 
years worked.  If a woman retires five to ten years before a man, her 
pension will be somewhere between 7 percent and 20 percent less 
than a man’s.126  This ensures that differential treatment persists 
long after retirement. 
 In addition to early retirement, Chinese law also prohibits 
women from engaging in certain jobs, including working in mines,127 
felling and stacking timber, setting up scaffolding, demolishing 
buildings, working on electric power lines, and other jobs requiring 
dangerous or intense physical labor.128  The labor regulations 
establish broader protections for menstruating women, pregnant 
women, and nursing mothers, who are barred from working in walk-
in refrigerators, cold water, or other jobs involving low 
temperatures.129  It is unclear whether this form of paternalism is 
any more justifiable than the concerns underlying the early 
retirement system.  Some test of strength, stamina, or agility would 
better replicate a person’s physical capacities than a blanket ban.  
Although arguably well intended, these regulations underscore the 
general notion that women are not fit for the workplace, or some 
sizable fraction of it. 
 Local regulations likewise discriminate against women.  In 2003, 
Hunan published Temporary Measures for Physical Examinations of 
Civil Servants, which apply to civil servants and those working in 
state-sponsored institutions such as universities and hospitals.130  
The Hunan guidelines require that women who work in a medical 
facility’s gynecological department have “normally developed 
secondary sexual characteristics; symmetrical breasts without lumps; 
vulva [that is not] inflamed, ulcerous or tumorous; and uterus [that is 
                                                                                                                      
 125.  Id. at 4. 
 126.  Chen Weimin & Li Ying, supra note 117, at 46. 
 127.  Laodong Fa [Labor Law] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l 
People’s Cong., July 5, 1994, effective Jan. 1, 1995) art. 59. 
 128.  Nüzhigong Jinji Laodong Fanweide Guiding [Regulation on the Scope of 
Prohibited Labor for Female Workers] (promulgated by the Ministry of Labor, Jan. 18, 
1990) art. 4 (establishing a blanket ban on these and other activities). 
129.  Id. 
 130.  Cai Dingjian, Fanjiuye Qishi Zhonghe Yanjiu Baogao [Overview Report of 
Employment Discrimination], in EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION IN CHINA, supra note 
71, at 5, 23. 
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not] prolapsed.”131  This regulation certainly sounds like per se 
discrimination, at least to one trained in U.S. antidiscrimination law, 
because there are no corresponding anatomical specifications for male 
workers.  As they stand, these requirements heighten the burden on 
women, subjecting their bodies to notions of anatomical correctness 
that have no bearing on their ability to perform the job.  Moreover, 
this regulation might eliminate disabled persons and breast cancer 
survivors, suggesting multiple forms of discrimination. 
1B.  Efforts to Reform Gender Discrimination 
 The most significant legal reform in the area of women’s rights 
generally,132 and discrimination specifically, was the 2005 revision of 
the Law on the Protection of Women’s Rights and Interests (Revised 
Women’s Law).133  This law addresses several weaknesses in China’s 
existing legal structure, such as the underrepresentation of women in 
national and local politics, the fragility of women’s property rights, 
and the prevalence of sexual harassment in the workplace.134  For the 
first time,135 the law explicitly states that the promotion of equality 
between men and women is a basic “state policy,” lending additional 
rhetorical support to a position that the government has long 
exhorted.136 
 A group of elite scholars and officials began drafting revisions to 
the existing law in 2003, drawing heavily on international and 
comparative experience.137  This group included members of 
                                                                                                                      
 131.  Id. 
 132.  To be sure, other areas of gender reform are important, including the 
passage of regulations on domestic violence by the Supreme People’s Court and 
Ministry of Public Security. But these do not focus specifically on the issue of 
discrimination or employment discrimination. See Sheji Jiating Baoli Hunyin Anjian 
Shenli Zhinan [Adjudication Guidance on Cases Involving Domestic Violence in 
Marriage] (promulgated by the Sup. People’s Ct., Mar. 16, 2008). 
 133.  Funü Quanyi Baozhang Fa [Law on the Protection of Women’s Rights & 
Interests] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Apr. 3, 1992, 
amended Aug. 28, 2005, effective Dec. 1, 2005), available at http://www.npv.gov.cn/ 
englishnpc/Law/2007-12/13/content_1383859.htm. 
 134.  See Rong Jiaojiao, Law Revised to Protect Women’s Rights, CHINA 
FEATURES (Sept. 20, 2005), http://www.chinese-embassy.org.uk/eng/zt/t213042.htm 
(“Another highlight is that sexual harassment, for the first time, is made unlawful 
through legislation.”). 
 135.  Id. 
 136.  Funü Quanyi Baozhang Fa [Law on the Protection of Women’s Rights & 
Interests] art. 2 (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Apr. 3, 
1992, amended Aug. 28, 2005, effective Dec. 1, 2005), available at 
http://www.npv.gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/2007-12/13/content_1383859.htm. 
 137.  See generally Rangita de Silva de Alwis, Opportunities & Challenges for 
Gender-Based Legal Reform in China, 5 EAST ASIA L. REV. 197, 198–99 (2010) (“The 
2005 amendments to the 1992 Law on the Protection of Women’s Right and Interests 
(LPWRI) in China was a milestone law reform initiative.  Since then, other gender-
based law and policy reforms have spawned nationally and locally in the wake of the 
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government-run entities like the All China Women’s Federation and 
the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, as well as civil society actors 
such as the Center for Women’s Law and Legal Services at Peking 
University.138  Through workshops, conferences, and roundtables, 
these scholar-activists helped channel recommendations from United 
Nations committees and other countries’ laws into the legislative 
process of the PRC.139  Although not all their suggestions made it into 
the law, they laid out several issues—including discrimination, 
domestic violence, and property rights—for future regulations and 
provincial implementation. 
 Despite various improvements made in the law, the Committee 
on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women 
issued a long list of concerns and recommendations in its 2006 
Report.140  First, the Report expressed concern over China’s “capacity 
to understand the meaning of substantive equality and non-
discrimination.”141  Because many Chinese still do not understand 
the concept or problems of discrimination, the Report specifically 
recommended that China include “a definition of discrimination 
against women in its domestic law, encompassing both direct and 
indirect discrimination.”142  As we saw above in Part II, 
discrimination against women is quite widespread in China; one 
reason may be a lack of understanding as to why discrimination is a 
problem. 
 A second concern was the lack of “effective legal remedies” for 
violations of the Women’s Convention,143 as well as a lack of 
“awareness-raising and sensitization measures about such legal 
remedies against discrimination so that women can avail themselves 
of them.”144  Indeed, the lack of effective remedies and the general 
failure to implement laws are constant criticisms leveled at the 
Chinese legal system.145  As discussed in Part V, discrimination 
                                                                                                                      
LPWRI revisions, and have mobilized a slowly growing gender and law network in 
China.”). 
 138.  Id. at 205. 
 139.  Id. 
 140.  See Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, Rep. on 
its 36th Sess., Aug. 7–25, 2006, ¶ 8, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/CHN/CO/6 (Aug. 25, 2006) 
[hereinafter CEDAW Report] (“It calls upon the State party to submit the present 
concluding comments to all relevant ministries and to Parliament so as to ensure their 
full implementation.”). 
 141.  Id. ¶ 10. 
 142.  Id. 
 143.  Id. ¶ 11. 
 144.  Id. ¶ 12. 
 145.  See, e.g., Yuwen Li, Court Reform in China: Problems, Progress and 
Prospects, in IMPLEMENTATION OF LAW IN THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 55, 82 
(Jianfu Chen et al. eds., 2002) (noting that “the gap between law-making and law 
enforcement by the courts has become more obvious” in recent years). 
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against women continues in China, but no plaintiff has stepped 
forward to challenge it.146 
 A third concern was “traditional stereotypes regarding the role of 
women and men in society.”147  In other words, the divide between 
men’s work and women’s work remains relatively clear in China, with 
men occupying higher rungs and women down below.  The Report 
recommended a broad campaign of education and awareness raising, 
particularly directed at men and boys, through radio, television, and 
print media.148  The Report also suggested the inclusion of gender 
sensitivity into school curriculum and textbooks.149  The Report made 
other suggestions, but they lie beyond the scope of this Article. 
 Debate continues over the differential retirement age, but little 
forward momentum is detectable.  In April 2009, one of China’s most 
senior female politicians, Chen Zhili, called on the city of Beijing to 
take the lead in equalizing the retirement age for cadres.150  Noting 
that Beijing’s decision to do so “would have a huge influence on the 
rest of China,” Ms. Chen believed that leveling the retirement age 
would greatly advance equality between the sexes.151  The mere fact 
that a person of Ms. Chen’s stature would make such an appeal is 
significant, and it indicates some level of support among Chinese 
government officials.  Still, the fact that this proposal has not moved 
forward in over a year does not bode well for its implementation. 
2A.  Hukou Discrimination 
 The household registration, or hukou, system helps maintain the 
physical separation of urban residents from their rural brethren.  
Instituted in 1958, the system initially permitted the government to 
distribute resources and benefits more effectively, to control 
migration from rural areas to urban settings, and to keep closer tabs 
on criminal activity.152  Citizens were categorized according to their 
place of residence, as well as whether they were rural (“agricultural”) 
                                                                                                                      
 146.  See infra Part V.B. 
 147.  See CEDAW Report, supra note 140, ¶ 17 (“The Committee is concerned 
that these prevailing attitudes continue to devalue women and violate their human 
rights.”). 
 148.  Id. ¶ 18. 
 149.  Id. 
 150.  See Zhang Haiyan, Quanguo Fulian Zhuxi Chen Zhili Huyu: Beijing 
Shuaixian Shixing Nannü Tongling Tuixiu [Chairwoman of the All China Women’s 
Federation Chen Zhili Calls on Beijing to Take the Lead in Implementing Equal 
Retirement Age], FAZHIWANG [LEGAL DAILY], Apr. 3, 2009, http://www.legaldaily.com. 
cn/0801/2009-04/03/content_1064630.htm (noting that the committee chairwoman 
urged the city of Beijing to experiment with a workplace policy that calls for the same 
retirement age for male and female upper level employees). 
 151.  Id. 
 152.  Migrant Workers in China, CHINA LAB. BULL. (June 6, 2008), 
http://www.china-labour.org.hk/en/node/100259. 
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or urban (“non-agricultural”).153  If a citizen had a Beijing hukou, for 
instance, that citizen benefited from the panoply of benefits 
(insurance, education, social welfare, and even food rations during 
the PRC’s more tumultuous periods) that Beijing provided its 
residents.  If, on the other hand, you lived in Beijing without a 
Beijing hukou, you did not have access to these services.154 
 In recent years, the system has relaxed somewhat.155  Wealthy 
or educated rural residents can apply to become local residents of 
various cities, depending upon criteria set out by the city.156  The 
estimated 150 million migrants working in Chinese cities offer proof 
that people are no longer as tightly bound to their native villages as 
they were in the early days of the PRC.157  However, this change does 
not mean that life has become any easier for today’s migrant workers.  
Typically, they toil at low-wage jobs without social security, a 
guaranteed wage, or access to medical care.158  Equally troubling, 
their children are often ineligible to attend local schools, creating 
another generation of marginalization.159 
 A number of regulations reinforce the hukou system and further 
disadvantage migrant workers.  National regulations, for instance, 
instruct local employers—private, public, and state organs alike—on 
how to hire workers who come from outside their locality.160  One 
regulation from the Ministry of Labor provided that outside workers 
could be hired only if no local person was qualified to fill the position 
and the local labor and employment agencies approved the employer’s 
request for an outside hire.161  In other words, local people were 
preferred in job recruitment, and outsiders could fill positions only 
when a local agency approved of the placement.  Although this 
                                                                                                                      
 153.  CONG.-EXEC. COMM’N ON CHINA, supra note 24, at 2–3. 
 154.  See id. at 7–8 (education). 
 155.  See Hein Mallee, Migration, Hukou and Resistance, in CHINESE SOCIETY: 
CHANGE, CONFLICT AND RESISTANCE 83, 99 (Elizabeth J. Perry & Mark Selden eds., 
2000) (describing the recent relaxation of the hukou system as a product of both state-
initiated changes and large-scale labor migration). 
 156.  See, e.g., CONG.-EXEC. COMM’N ON CHINA, supra note 24, at 5 (noting that 
Zhejiang Province allows individuals who have purchased a home of a certain price or 
size to obtain a local hukou). 
 157.  China’s New-Generation Migrant Workers Number 100 Million, PEOPLE’S 
DAILY ONLINE (June 22, 2010), http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90001/90782/7033 
954.html (“Data from the National Bureau of Statistics shows that there were a total of 
230 million rural migrant workers in China in 2009, including 150 million working 
outside their hometowns.”). 
 158.  Migrant Workers in China, supra note 152. 
 159.  Id. 
 160.  See, e.g., Nongcun Laodongli Kuasheng Liudong Jiuye Guanli Zanxing 
Guiding [Temporary Regulation on the Administration of Cross-Provincial 
Employment of Rural Workers] (promulgated by the Ministry of Labor, Nov. 17, 1994, 
withdrawn Feb. 7, 2005) art. 2. The regulations apply to private companies (qiye), 
individual economic organizations and state organs, enterprise organizations, and 
social groups. See id. 
 161.  Id. art. 5. 
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regulation has since been withdrawn,162 it set a precedent to which 
many cities have clung.  Nanjing, for instance, still encourages 
employers to hire local laborers: “first urban, then rural; first this 
city, then other cities; first this province, then other provinces.”163  By 
mandating “first this city, then other cities,”164 this principle 
privileges not only Nanjing residents, but also any other urban 
residents.  This preference represents discrimination against rural 
people in its purest form.   
 Other cities restrict migrant labor in even less nuanced ways.165  
Some cities, either by enacting a strict numerical target or by setting 
an acceptable percentage of outsiders in the total work force, impose 
quotas on the number of outside workers allowed to work in the 
city.166  Other cities prohibit or severely restrict the use of migrant 
workers in specific positions.  Shanghai, for instance, closed several 
positions, including shop assistants, maintenance staff, and 
custodians, to persons without local residency.167  Although these 
positions are not high-status positions, they would likely appeal to 
the frequently less educated and underprivileged migrant class.  
More expansively, Beijing placed restrictions on various white-collar 
positions, including administrators in the financial and insurance 
sectors, accountants, bank tellers, and staff at “star-level” hotels.168  
These regulations restrict the number of positions available to 
migrant workers and steer them toward the most grueling jobs. 
                                                                                                                      
 162.  Laodong he Shehui Baozhangbu Guanyu Feizhi ‘Nongcun Laodongli 
Kuasheng Liudong Jiuye Guanli Zanxing Guiding’ ji Youguan Peitao Wenjiande 
Tongzhi [Notice on the Abolishment of the Ministry of Labor and Social Security’s 
‘Temporary Regulation on the Administration of Cross-Provincial Employment of Rural 
Workers’ and Related Accompanying Documents] (promulgated by the Ministry of 
Labor and Social Security, Feb. 7, 2005), available at http://fj.cq.gov.cn/wmfw/news/ 
2008-3/183_713.shtml. The regulation was withdrawn in 2005. 
 163.  Nanjingshi Wailai Laodongli Laodong Guanli Guiding [Nanjing 
Regulations on Managing Labor of Outside Laborers] (promulgated by the Nanjing 
City People’s Government, July 7, 1999, effective July 7, 1999) art. 6. 
 164.  Id. 
 165.  Bingqin Li, Urban Social Exclusion in Transitional China 22–23 (London 
Sch. of Econ. Ctr. for Analysis of Soc. Exclusion, Paper No. 82, 2004), 
http://sticerd.lse.ac.uk/dps/case/cp/CASEpaper82.pdf. 
 166.  Yao Guojian, Identity Discrimination in Employment—Household 
Registration and Regional Origin, in TAKING EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 
SERIOUSLY: CHINESE AND EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVES 133, 136 (Yuwen Li & Jenny 
Goldschmidt eds., 2009); Liu Xin, Dui Jiuye Qishi Xingzheng Fagui Guizhang Qingli 
Baogao [A Report on Administrative Rules and Regulations in Employment 
Discrimination], in EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION IN CHINA, supra note 71, at 448, 
453, 454. 
 167.  Bingqin Li, supra note 165, at 22. 
 168.  See Nian Benshi Yunxu he Xianzhi Shiyong Waidi Renyuan de Hangye 
Gongzhong Fanwei [Scope of Jobs and Professions that Permit and Restrict the Usage 
of Outside Personnel in Beijing in 1996] (promulgated by Beijing Labor Bureau, Mar. 
28, 1996). 
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 Apart from job restrictions and prohibitions, cities also levy fees 
on employers that hire outside workers; these fees fall under the 
various guises of “registration fees,” “work management fees,” 
“processing fees,” “administrative service fees,” and so on.169  The 
effect is to drive up the cost of hiring outside workers and to 
encourage the hiring of local employees. 
 Finally, cities may require migrant workers to obtain work 
permits, residency permits, health permits, and other documentation 
in order to work.170  The hassle of obtaining such permits, coupled 
with the fear that one’s status as a non-resident is automatically 
disqualifying, may dissuade many migrant workers from applying for 
this paperwork.  In this way, cities can prevent migrant workers from 
taking up local posts and greatly restrict the number of eligible 
candidates.  At the same time, these regulations generate revenue 
from people who can least afford it.171 
2B. Efforts to Reform Hukou Discrimination 
 The new millennium has witnessed a number of reforms to the 
hukou system.  While these reforms were percolating in the 1990s,172 
a wave of dissatisfaction hit the Chinese press in 2000.173  In 
December 1999, the Beijing government published 103 additional job 
categories from which migrant workers would be barred.174  After 
vigorous academic debate, and most likely with the imprimatur of 
high officials, Chinese newspapers ran editorials and personal pleas 
from migrant workers that questioned the hukou system.175  One 
editorial acknowledged the problem of local protectionism but 
questioned whether senior officials had considered the national 
picture.176  Another noted that China was “treating its precious labor 
resources as a burden and inhibiting the economic interests, the very 
livelihoods, of tens of millions of rural laborers.”177  News websites 
                                                                                                                      
 169.  Liu Xin, supra note 166, at 454. 
 170.  Id. 
 171.  Yu Zhu, Liyue Lin & Bin Wang, Social Protection for Rural-Urban 
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 173.  See Erik Eckholm, China’s Controls on Rural Workers Stir Some Rarely 
Seen Heated Opposition, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10, 2000, at A10. 
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 176.  Id. 
 177.  Id. (quoting a reader commentary from the China Youth Daily). 
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and Internet bulletin boards also posted criticisms of the system and 
calls for its reform.178 
 Over time, even the official state news media began to criticize 
the hukou system.  An article from People’s Daily made a number of 
strong claims, such as (a) that residency and migration were “basic 
rights” (with the implication that they should not to be violated by 
state or local policy); (b) that the hukou system itself was 
incompatible with China’s current economic development and 
tarnished its image of reform and openness; (c) that the system 
enabled corruption, as evident in the prevalence of bribes to officials 
and the auctioning of local residency permits by small cities; and (d) 
that abolishing the current system followed “the general trend of 
history.”179  The article ambitiously predicted that the system would 
one day be considered a relic of the planned economy.180 
 As noted, the central government had already initiated modest 
reform efforts.  In 1997, the State Council initiated an experimental 
program permitting migrant workers to obtain local hukou in selected 
small towns and cities.181  If they lived in the locality for at least two 
years, with a stable income and a permanent residence, migrants 
could apply for permanent residency.182  Over 540,000 migrants 
became full residents in 328 cities,183 and this success lead the State 
Council to expand the experiment to cover all small towns and 
cities.184  Nevertheless, given the episodic nature of many migrant 
workers’ work assignments (such as construction or infrastructure) 
and the seasonal rhythms of their lives (returning home to their 
native villages during holidays), these requirements still exclude 
highly transient migrants, who are arguably the most precariously 
positioned.  Additionally, large cities such as Beijing, Shanghai, and 
Shenzhen—each of which employs millions of migrant workers—were 
exempt from the program.185 
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 The State Council continues to issue directives that relax the 
hukou system and mitigate the discriminatory effects of various local 
regulations.  In 2003, for instance, it issued a Notice on Successfully 
Managing Employment and Services for Migrant Workers.186  The 
preface describes the current employment prospects for migrant 
workers in unusually candid terms: they “still face a number of 
irrational restrictions in employment; their rights and interests are 
not effectively protected; they are not paid their due wages; they are 
charged excessive fees; and they are subject to other serious 
phenomena.”187  The Notice then calls on local governments to 
“abolish irrational restrictions on the employment of migrant 
workers,” including the abolishment of administrative approvals, 
professional restrictions excluding migrants, and registration 
requirements.188  It also mandates that local governments impose the 
same technical qualifications and health standards on migrant 
workers as on local residents.189  With the Notice, the central 
government took a first step toward peeling away the encrustation of 
discriminatory provisions that had piled up from the 1990s. 
 Subsequent regulations in 2004 and 2006 likewise target 
discriminatory regulations.  The 2004 Notice on Further Improving 
the Employment Environment for Migrant Workers praises the 
“large-scale work” of various cities and local departments since the 
2003 Notice.190  But it also recognizes the manifold problems facing 
migrant workers, which include inadequate training services and 
recruitment opportunities, employment fees, numerous procedures, 
unpaid wages, violations of their rights and interests, and “illegal 
elements” who defraud migrant workers by charging recruitment fees 
for nonexistent jobs.191  The 2004 Notice repeats, almost verbatim, 
the 2003 Notice’s instruction to abolish administrative approvals, 
professional restrictions, and registration requirements, but the 2004 
Notice uses the terms “discriminatory regulations and irrational 
restrictions,” an acknowledgment that these regulations offend both 
morality and reason.192 
 In 2006, the State Council issued Certain Opinions on Resolving 
Problems of Migrant Workers.193  The Opinions acknowledge the 
                                                                                                                      
 186.  Zuohao Nongmin Jincheng Wugong Jiuye Guanli he Fuwu Gongzuode 
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 187.  Id. pmbl. 
 188.  Id. art. 2. 
 189.  Id. 
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Tongzhi [Notice on Further Improving the Employment Environment for Migrant 
Workers] (promulgated by State Council, Dec. 27, 2004). 
 191.  Id. pmbl. 
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Council Opinions on Resolving Problems of Migrant Workers] (promulgated by State 
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“important contributions” that migrant workers have made to the 
development of China and articulate a series of programmatic steps 
to alleviate the burden of this disenfranchised subpopulation: 
Migrant workers are a new labor force that has sprung up in the 
processes of industrialization and urbanization during China’s reform 
and opening up.  Their residency status is rural, but they engage 
primarily in non-agricultural production.  Some go out to do both 
industrial and agricultural work during the non-agricultural season, 
and are very mobile.  Others have been employed in cities for a long 
time, and comprise a large proportion of industrial workers.  A large 
number of migrants work in cities and towns, where they have made 
important contributions to the construction of a modern China.194 
Article 5 of the Opinions sets out basic principles, such as “equal 
treatment.”  It calls on cities to “[r]espect and maintain migrant 
workers’ legal rights, eliminate discriminatory regulations and 
systemic obstacles to their working in cities, [and] permit them to 
enjoy equal rights and obligations in urban professional 
employment.”195  Other provisions address now-familiar dilemmas of 
unpaid wages, labor contracts, employment services and training, and 
social protections.196 
 But the problem, as the title intimates, is that these are merely 
opinions.  Although legally binding,197 they do not specify the 
sanctions a court should impose upon finding a violation.  As a result, 
it is unlikely that a court of law would find against a municipality for 
contravening these regulations.  Like so much Chinese law, the 
Opinions propose prohibitions but not sanctions to enforce them. 
 Despite some changes in the residency requirements, the 
essential structure of the hukou system remains largely intact.  By 
dividing citizens into “agricultural” and “non-agricultural,” then 
allocating resources unevenly between the city and countryside, the 
PRC continues to reinforce the marginalization of hundreds of 
millions of citizens.  Although recent reform efforts aim to ameliorate 
some of the discriminatory burdens that cities have attached to 
migrant workers, the systemic discrimination remains untouched.  By 
permitting greater mobility than it did fifty years ago, China has 
                                                                                                                      
Council, Mar. 27, 2006). Article 5 lists the “Basic Principles,” the first of which reads 
“Equal treatment. Respect and protect the legal rights and interests of migrant 
workers; eliminate discriminatory regulations and systematic obstacles facing migrant 
workers who work in cities; make them enjoy the same rights and obligations as city 
residents in the professional fields.” Id. art. 5. 
 194.  Id. pmbl. 
 195.  Id. art. 5. 
 196.  Id. arts. 6, 8, 11–13, 16. 
 197.  See Wang Chenguang, Introduction: An Emerging Legal System, in 
INTRODUCTION TO CHINESE LAW 1, 16 (Wang Chenguang & Zhang Xianchu eds., 1997) 
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follow . . . .”). 
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slightly blurred the division between urbanites and villagers.  Yet, as 
one scholar concluded, “Chinese society by and large can still be 
divided into an ‘agricultural’ segment and a ‘non-agricultural’ one, 
and glaring differences remain in entitlements between the two.”198 
3A. Discrimination Against Infectious Disease Carriers 
 With an estimated 120 million carriers of the hepatitis B 
virus,199 4.5 million known cases of tuberculosis,200 and 700,000 
carriers of HIV,201 a sizeable portion of the Chinese populace faces 
the possibility of a different form of discrimination.  Quite apart from 
the public health concerns raised by these diseases, the Chinese 
government has also had to deal with employment-related issues, 
such as workplace safety and discrimination.202  For a long time, the 
government’s thumb was decidedly on the side of public health and 
safety.  Numerous laws and regulations excluded qualified but 
diseased persons from a variety of positions.  Recent reform efforts, 
however, suggest both a growing willingness to strengthen the rights 
of disease carriers and a clearer awareness of the actual threat that 
such persons pose to public safety generally and the workplace in 
particular.  Perhaps more importantly, citizen activism has played a 
critical role in promoting reform; the mobilization of public opinion 
has signaled to the Chinese government that hepatitis B 
discrimination is palpable, destructive, and in certain instances 
deadly. 
 A number of national laws and regulations prevent persons who 
carry infectious diseases from engaging in certain lines of work.  
These regulations reflect the comprehensible concern that placing an 
infectious disease carrier in certain occupations might facilitate the 
spread of disease.  Thus, the Food Safety Law prohibits persons with 
“dysentery, typhus, viral hepatitis, active pulmonary tuberculosis, or 
purulent or weeping skin diseases” from “working in direct contact 
with food for consumption.”203  This provision excludes a narrow 
range of job possibilities for a narrowly tailored group of disease 
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carriers.  Hepatitis A, for instance, can be spread through 
contaminated food or water,204 while tuberculosis can be spread 
aerially when an infected person coughs, sneezes, or even speaks.205  
Prohibiting carriers of these diseases from working in food production 
bears a rational relationship to public safety. 
 Unfortunately, other regulations are less defensible.  The 
Administrative Regulations on Public Hygiene, for instance, restrict 
the same carriers of disease listed in the Food Safety Law from a wide 
range of posts, mainly involving direct contact with customers: hotels, 
restaurants, inns, cafes, bars, teahouses, public baths, barber shops, 
beauty salons, movie theatres, dance halls, concert halls, gyms, public 
parks, museums, libraries, and more.206  Without doing a separate 
epidemiological study for each disease, it seems clear that this 
regulation sweeps too broadly. 
 Hepatitis B provides a good example: it can be spread by birth; 
sex with an infected person; sharing needles, razors, syringes, or 
toothbrushes with an infected person; direct contact with blood or 
open sores of an infected persons; or exposure to blood from sharp 
instruments (as used in ear-piercing or tattooing).207  It seems highly 
improbable that a person with the hepatitis B virus would spread the 
disease if working at a movie theatre or a museum, for example, 
although one can imagine a hypothetical situation where such contact 
might occur.  But by restricting carriers of HBV from all manner of 
public employment, the regulation sends a strong symbolic message, 
both to carriers and a public that is largely uninformed about the 
transmission of such diseases, that carriers pose a health risk, should 
not work in public places, and should avoid coming into contact with 
the general public. 
 Similarly, the 1989 Supervisory Regulations on Hygiene in 
Cosmetic Products ban some people from working directly in the 
production of cosmetics.208  In addition to carriers of the diseases 
listed above (viral hepatitis, tuberculosis, and dysentery), persons 
with eczema, ringworm, and other dermatological conditions are also 
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prohibited.209  This prohibition may be rational for ringworm, which 
can be spread through indirect contact if a second person touches an 
object that has been touched by the infected person.  Eczema, 
however, is not contagious.210  Prohibiting persons with eczema from 
working in cosmetic production serves no purpose except to 
discriminate against them.  By excluding people in this way, the 
State Council signals that their skin problem—a superficial 
blemish—renders them unfit for the work of “beautiful people.” 
 These restrictions entrench discrimination against carriers of 
diseases, excluding capable workers from jobs based on unfounded 
fears rather than genuine science.  Regulators should instead 
determine the nexus between the spread of the disease (whether 
through casual contact, blood, bodily fluid, etc.) and the likelihood of 
contagion for a particular position.  They can then specify which 
diseases are particularly contagious, and which positions should be 
off limits for medical reasons.  Some comfort can be drawn from the 
fact that these quite sweeping regulations were issued in the 1980s, 
whereas more recent laws—like the 2009 Food Safety Law noted 
above—significantly narrow the scope to a few forbidden posts.211  
However, until these regulations are formally withdrawn, they 
remain valid law in the PRC.  Moreover, because recently 
promulgated laws often explicitly carve out job posts proscribed by 
early regulations and directives passed decades ago,212 these 
regulations continue to generate prejudice against people. 
3B. Efforts to Reform Discrimination Against Infectious Disease 
Carriers 
 Not long after the Zhang and Zhou incidents,213 various 
government bodies began revising laws and regulations.  In 2005, the 
Ministry of Personnel issued the government’s first responsive 
regulation, permitting some carriers of the hepatitis B virus to work 
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in civil service positions.214  Applicants with “chronic or acute 
hepatitis” were still barred, but “antigen carriers” who had been 
examined could still work.215 
 In 2007, the Ministry of Labor and Social Security promulgated 
two regulations that secure the employment rights of HBV carriers.  
The first, Opinion on Protecting the Employment Rights of Carriers 
of the Hepatitis Surface Antigen, deals exclusively with carriers.216  It 
provides, in pertinent part, that “[a]part from those jobs specifically 
proscribed by national laws, administrative regulations, and 
regulations from the Ministry of Health due to ease of contagion, 
employers may neither refuse to hire, nor fire, a carrier of the 
hepatitis B antigen because he carries the antigen.”217  The 
regulation “strictly regulates the employer’s request and use of 
medical examinations,” permitting them only when there is “actual 
need” based on the exigencies of the job.218  An employer cannot force 
a job applicant to take a hepatitis B test unless HBV carriers are 
prohibited from taking the job by national laws or administrative 
regulations.219  The regulation also calls on medical institutions to 
“protect the privacy rights of hepatitis antigen carriers,” suggesting 
that they too have a responsibility to keep this delicate information in 
the proper hands.220  Finally, the regulation calls on local offices of 
the Labor Ministry, as well as labor arbitration committees, to protect 
the legal rights and interests of laborers in general.  Specifically, the 
regulation calls on these actors “to prevent occurrences of the 
employment discrimination issue” in hiring and employing 
workers.221  This regulation represents a targeted response to the 
problem of discrimination against HBV carriers.  By calling on labor 
arbitration committees, the regulation holds out the promise of 
implementing antidiscrimination law. 
 Second, the Ministry of Labor of Social Security promulgated 
Regulations on Employment Services and Employment 
Administration, which complement the Employment Promotion Law 
in various ways,222 including prohibitions of discrimination against 
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women, disabled persons, and carriers of infectious diseases.223  
Apropos of HBV, the Regulations, for the first time, prescribe a 
punishment for employers that discriminate against carriers.  If an 
employer requires an HBV test for a job not prohibited to carriers by 
national law or administrative regulation, the employer faces a fine of 
up to 1,000 rmb (about $150).224 
 In this way, the regulation addresses a fairly common type of 
indirect discrimination in China, as analyzed more fully in the 
following section.  Employers may claim that the medical 
examination (of which the HBV test forms a part) is a neutral policy 
designed to ensure the health of all applicants, but they may instead 
use the results to exclude HBV carriers.  Although 1,000 rmb is a 
small sum for many Chinese employers, the Regulations are helpful 
in articulating a sanction, something Chinese labor law has tended to 
avoid. 
 In February 2010, the Chinese government fully scrapped HBV 
testing.225  Three ministries issued a Notice to prohibit employers and 
schools from requesting HBV testing in medical examinations, 
requesting the results of an applicant’s HBV tests, or asking the 
applicant if he carries the antigen.226  Medical institutions are 
likewise banned from giving schools or employers the results of the 
medical examination.227  The Notice also recognizes the important 
privacy rights that attach to this information by making it for the 
examinee’s eyes only.228  Finally, the Notice includes sanctions 
against employers and schools that illegally request HBV 
examinations.229 
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IV. THE HBV SOCIAL MOVEMENT 
 In 2003, the cases of Zhou Yichao and Zhang Xianzhu first raised 
the profile of HBV discrimination.  Zhou’s criminal trial and Zhang’s 
administrative trial received national and international attention.230  
The trials informed government officials, among others, that 
employment discrimination against HBV carriers required a rapid 
response.  But the cases also set in motion a wider chain of events—a 
social movement that has clamored for legal reform.  Before 
examining the various activities and channels by which HBV 
advocates have fomented legal change, this Part provides a 
rudimentary primer to illuminate the basic concepts of social 
movements. 
 Sociologists attend to three facets of social movements to explain 
their emergence, evolution, and success (or failure).231  First, scholars 
direct attention to the particular group’s political opportunities and 
constraints, including changes in institutional structures or informal 
power relations.232  This analysis may also include the openness of 
the political system, the stability of elites that support the system, 
and the state’s capacity for repression.233  In other words, one must 
appreciate the broader political context and the internal dynamics 
that permit a movement to gain traction in a particular society. 
 Second, and inseparable from the issue of context, scholars 
consider the “mobilizing structures” of a movement: the collective 
vehicles, networks, and organizations through which people advocate 
for change.234  For a movement to survive and achieve success, 
however defined, activists must create organizational structures to 
sustain collective action.235  The individual accomplishments of 
people like Martin Luther King, Jr. and Susan B. Anthony are 
impressive, but neither would likely have succeeded without an 
organization of supporters, such as the Southern Christian 
Leadership Conference or the National Women’s Rights Convention.  
The context of rights-promotion for HBV carriers in China is, of 
course, vastly different from late nineteenth-century New England or 
mid-twentieth-century Georgia, but the importance of organizational 
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structures in sustaining collective action runs throughout most social 
movements.236 
 Third, a proper analysis must account for “framing processes,” 
the shared meanings through which advocates and affected people 
understand their situation.237  Social movements are predicated upon 
the tension between shared anxieties about a particular problem and 
optimism that collective action can redress it.238  The framing process 
asks: What stories do they tell to explain their particular conditions?  
How do they interpret events to fit within these dominant 
narratives?239 
 To sum up, any analysis of social movements needs to account 
for the sociopolitical context in which a movement emerges, the 
organizational networks that foster the desired change, and the 
signification processes through which agents perceive the problem 
and the solutions.  There is room, of course, to quibble with the lines 
between these categories,240 but they seem to constitute three vital 
acts of any social movement. 
 As noted, 2003 was “the year of antidiscrimination” for HBV 
carriers.241  Within months of each other, the Zhou and Zhang cases 
showed how serious and widespread discrimination was; moreover, 
they showed that the government itself was an agent of 
discrimination.  The incidents provided a useful political opportunity 
around which antidiscrimination advocates could raise awareness of 
the problem of employment discrimination, particularly 
discrimination against carriers of HBV.  Two ambitious and 
accomplished young men sought to join government service, the 
highest calling for aspiring youth in traditional China from the Tang 
Dynasty to the present.242  Both passed the “substantive” portions of 
the challenging civil service examination, yet another proud tradition 
that ensures that only the most qualified enter government 
service.243  Yet both were denied positions due to a factor that they 
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could not control, a factor that would imperil neither their ability to 
work nor the health of their colleagues.244 
 In recent years, high-profile cases such as Zhou’s and Zhang’s 
have catalyzed legal reform efforts, or at the very least symbolized 
larger problems that litigation aims to address.245  The criminal trial 
of Zhou Yichao and his subsequent execution may not have aroused 
much public sympathy, but the affair surely captured the attention of 
the government.  In contrast, Zhang’s decision to channel his 
disappointment through administrative litigation served more than 
his own ends, coupled with extensive media coverage, ensured that 
hundreds of millions of people in and outside of China.246  The court’s 
highly technical decision did not vindicate Zhang,247 but it did spark 
a debate about the human rights of one of China’s largest 
disadvantaged groups and the function of courts in protecting those 
rights.  At the time, Chinese courts manifested little sympathy for 
plaintiffs suing for discrimination and generally avoided ascribing 
any kind of culpability to government actors.248  However routine the 
filing of an employment discrimination action may seem to American 
readers, Zhang’s decision to litigate was by no means automatic.  His 
parents firmly opposed the decision to sue.249  At that time, very few 
                                                                                                                      
 244.  See Ching-Ching Ni, supra note 1, at A5 (noting that hepatitis B cannot be 
contracted without the exchange of bodily fluids). 
 245.  The linking of cases or incidents to subsequent legal reform is a ripe topic 
for study. Important case studies would include the Yang Jia case (mental health of 
criminal defendants), the She Xianglin cases (sentencing and proof), the Deng Yujiao 
case (murder of government official by woman he tried to rape), or any of the recent 
murders in detention centers. See infra Appendix. 
 246.  In contrast, Zhang's decision to channel his disappointment through 
administrative litigation served more than his own ends; through extensive outreach to 
the media, HBV advocates ensure that hundreds of millions of people in and outside of 
China could learn about Zhang's case. See Zhou Wei & Li Cheng, Xianfa Pingdeng, 
Ziyou yu Fanqishide Gongyi Susong—Anli, Guocheng yu Pinglun [Public Interest 
Litigation in Constitutional Equality, Liberty & Antidiscrimination—Cases, Processes 
& Criticisms] 76 (2009) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (listing 
numerous Chinese articles about the lawsuit and subsequent hearings). 
 247.  The court merely found that the hospital that administered the medical 
examination wrongly concluded that Zhang was unfit to work at the Personnel Bureau. 
Accordingly, the Bureau’s adoption of the hospital’s conclusion lacked a factual basis. 
But the court did not order compensation for Zhang or order the Personnel Bureau to 
hire him. ZHOU WEI, ZHONGGUODE LAODONG JIUYE QISHI: FALÜ YU XIANSHI 
[EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION IN CHINA: LEGISLATION & REALITY] 348, 355–56 (2006). 
 248.  One much discussed case involved Jiang Tao, who sued the Chengdu 
branch of the People’s Bank of China in early 2002. In job advertisements, the Bank 
required male applicants to be 168 centimeters (5’7”), but Jiang stood 165 centimeters 
(5’6”). With the help of his professor, Zhou Wei, Jiang sued the Bank, which then 
removed the height requirement from the advertisement. The removal mooted the case. 
As far as the court was concerned, “Plaintiff Jiang Tao’s claimed rights infringement 
has not yet occurred, and is hence not litigable.” Zhou Wei & Li Cheng, supra note 246, 
at 28. 
 249.  Id. at 78. 
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people had sued for employment discrimination, and those who did 
had little to show for it.250 
 In September 2003, Zhang’s name appeared on gandan 
xiangzhao, an online discussion board for HBV carriers.251  The site’s 
webmaster and various posters encouraged Zhang to take legal action 
to protect his rights.252  The site also served to connect Zhang with 
Professor Zhou Wei of Sichuan University in Chengdu.253  In 2002, 
Professor Zhou made headlines by litigating one of China’s first 
employment discrimination cases, which involved height 
discrimination.254  He wanted to expand his work in the field of 
constitutional litigation, ever hoping to “marry theory and 
practice.”255  He heard about Zhang’s case through gandan 
xiangzhao, and he instructed a student to contact Zhang through the 
website.256  Professor Zhou wanted “to fight for the basic survival 
rights of 120 million HBV carriers” and to “protect the basic rights of 
humanity.”257  Even at this early stage, the issue of employment 
discrimination was framed as a basic human right to survival.258 
                                                                                                                      
250.  The plaintiffs whose cases appear in this book sued on the 
understanding that their personal rights had been violated . . . . At the 
time they filed, most knew that the majority of lawsuits had been 
unsuccessful up until that time, but they nevertheless chose to litigate 
in order to balance individual rights and interests, transmit legal 
knowledge, and support the public interest. 
Id. at ii. 
 251.  Zhou Mu, “Yigan Qishi” An Kaiting: Zhou Wei Lüshi Jieshou Jizhe 
Zhuanfang [“Hepatitis B Discrimination” Case Opens: Lawyer Zhou Wei Accepts 
Exclusive Interview], CHENGDU WANBAO, Dec. 12, 2003, http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2003 
-12-20/03432419602.shtml. Meaning, literally, “the liver and gall bladder illuminate 
each other,” but more figuratively, devotion or sincerity between two people, gandan 
xiangzhao was one of the first fora where Chinese HBV carriers could openly and 
anonymously discuss their problems. Id. 
 252.  Id. 
 253.  Id. 
 254.  See Zhou Wei & Li Cheng, supra note 246, at 23. 
 255.  Id. at 1. 
 256.  See Zhou Mu, supra note 251. 
 257.  Id. 
 258.  In this way, HBV advocates share similarities with rural rights resisters as 
theorized by O’Brien and Li, who define rightful resistance as a “popular form of 
contention that operates near the boundary of authorized channels, employs the 
rhetoric and commitments of the powerful to curb the exercise of power, hinges on 
locating and exploiting divisions within the state, and relies on mobilizing support from 
the wider public.” KEVIN J. O’BRIEN & LIANJIANG LI, RIGHTFUL RESISTANCE IN RURAL 
CHINA 2 (2005). HBV advocates use the language of the state—constitutional law, 
national law, regulations, and so on—to frame their struggle, such as the right to 
survival. But they are quite keen on using authorized channels to effectuate legal 
change, as seen in the numerous petitions they have submitted to the National People’s 
Congress. They are also less concerned about exploiting the central-rural divide. For 
the most part, HBV advocates are comparatively wealthy, well educated, and more 
Internet-savvy than rural resisters. Moreover, rightful resisters occasionally agitate 
quite demonstrably (i.e., tearing up ballots, grabbing microphones to denounce local 
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 With Professor Zhou as his advocate, Zhang Xianzhu sued the 
Wuhu Personnel Bureau in November 2003.259  At the time, there 
was no law on point, so Professor Zhou fashioned a number of 
innovative corollaries to press the case.  For instance, Zhang’s 
complaint alleged that the Bureau’s conclusion not to hire him 
because of HBV constituted “malicious discrimination” and “did not 
fulfill the state’s legal obligations to respect and protect human 
rights, and to treat citizens equally under the law.”260  It was, in 
other words, a violation of the right to equality enshrined in Article 
33(2) of the Chinese Constitution.261  In subsequent filings, Professor 
Zhou noted that Chinese laws—such as the Law on the Prevention of 
Infectious Diseases and the Food Safety Law—and regulations—such 
as the Public Safety Hygiene Regulations A—bar HBV carriers from 
employment in potentially high-risk positions like medical facilities 
and food production plants.262  He argued that these concerns were 
inapposite to an office job in a personnel bureau.263 
 The court found the hospital—not a party to the lawsuit—had 
erred in concluding Zhang was unfit for the position.264  Anhui 
Province’s Provisional Implementing Regulations for the Physical 
Examination of National Civil Servants disqualified actively infected 
carriers of HBV, but it did not disqualify passive carriers like 
Zhang.265  Moreover, the hospital exceeded its jurisdiction in ruling 
on Zhang’s suitability; jurisdiction properly belonged to the Personnel 
Bureau.266  Ultimately, the court found that it could order no remedy 
because the recruitment cycle ended with the second-placed candidate 
filling the post.267  Zhang won a symbolic victory on a very minute 
                                                                                                                      
officials), and repose trust in the central government at the expense of local officials. 
Id. at 56–57. HBV advocates may demonstrate publicly, but not in a confrontational 
way, and there is not an implicit trust in the central government over local 
governments. Id. at 42–43. 
 259.  ZHOU WEI, supra note 247, at 326. 
 260.  Id. at 327. 
 261.  Id. 
 262.  For instance, the Food Safety Law, Law on Prevention of Infectious 
Diseases, Administrative Provisions on Public Hygiene, and Implementing Regulations 
for the Administrative Provisions on Public Hygiene all place various restrictions on 
HBV carriers in fields such as food production, water provision, child care, and even 
beauty salons. Id. at 329, 333. But the position Zhang applied for involved economic 
administration in the county affairs office, and was unlikely to involve the kind of 
direct human contact that would conceivably make an HBV carrier “undesirable.” Id. 
at 333. 
 263.  Id. at 355. 
 264.  Id. 
 265.  Id. at 333. 
 266.  Id. at 355. 
 267.  Id. 
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point of law, and his case made headlines all over China,268 but he 
left the courthouse as unemployed as when he entered it.269 
 Zhang’s lawsuit was itself an event, providing an opportunity to 
call attention to the larger issue of discrimination against HBV 
carriers.  Advocates informed the media about Zhang’s case, ensuring 
that dozens of journalists attended the hearings and reported on the 
announcement of the verdict.270  Members of the online support group 
gandan xiangzhao also attended the hearings, both to show support 
for Zhang and to increase visibility for their cause.  Press reports 
about a figure as sympathetic as Zhang opened up discussions and 
allayed people’s fears about working alongside HBV carriers.271 
 The gandan xiangzhao website quickly gained a large following 
among HBV carriers and others.272  An international domain name 
since 2001, the site had attracted 85,000 registered members by 
December 2004,273 and it served as a sounding board for the 
frustration of carriers and their experiences in education, 
employment, housing, public services, and other fields.  The ability to 
communicate openly, freely, and honestly about this topic brought 
together a large community of HBV advocates who had neither 
discussed the issue publicly nor publicly identified themselves as a 
group in need of legal protection. 
 The website also functioned as a collective action center.  On 
August 13, 2003, advocates posted a proposal on the site, asking the 
Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress (the highest 
legislative body of China) to review the constitutionality of the 
                                                                                                                      
 268.  See Zhou Wei & Li Cheng, supra note 246, at 76 (listing the newspaper 
articles covering the case, from such sources as People’s Daily, Xinhua, CCTV, 
Southern Weekend, and others). 
 269.  Zhang has not had an easy time finding work. He was let go from a job in a 
Guangzhou factory after his boss recognized him from the lawsuit. He also taught at an 
elementary school in Guizhou. He has received offers from hospitals and 
pharmaceutical companies to serve as a spokesperson, but he worried that such 
positions would “be equal to selling my own soul.” See generally Huang Maowang, 
Zhang Xianzhu: Yigan Zhidu Qishi Yin Ta Zhibu [Zhang Xianzhu: Systemic 
Discrimination Against Hepatitis B Stopped Because of Him], FAZHI ZHOUBAO [LEGAL 
WEEKLY], Aug. 29, 2008, http://www.dffy.com/sifashijian/jj/200808/200808291518 
38.htm. 
 270.  See Zhou Wei & Li Cheng, supra note 246, at 78–79 (noting that fifty 
journalists attended the December 19, 2003, hearing and over thirty journalists, from 
all over the country, attended the verdict on April 2, 2004). 
 271.  See, e.g., Du Wenjuan, Chuanranbing Fangzhifa: Zhang Xianzhu wei 1.2 
Yiren Weiquan [Ways of Curing Infectious Diseases: Zhang Xianzhu Protects the Rights 
of 120 Million], RENMIN RIBAO [PEOPLE’S DAILY], Apr. 13, 2005, http://www.china 
law.gov.cn/article/xwzx/fzxw/200504/20050400064939.shtml. 
 272.  Some of the plaintiffs analyzed in Part V of this Article also used the 
gandan site for legal and moral support. Plaintiffs 3 and 21, among others, used the 
site. See infra Appendix. 
273.  See “In the Hepatitis B Camp” Website: Home of Hepatitis B Carriers in 
China, HEPATITIS B CARRIERS BBS, http://www.hbvhbv.com/english (last visited Apr. 9, 
2011). 
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provincial regulations on civil servant examinations.274  Over 1,600 
Chinese citizens signed the petition before sending it to the Standing 
Committee in November 2003.275  The petition warned of “dozens, 
even hundreds, of Zhou Yichaos” if the government did not attend to 
this “serious social problem.”276  Invoking domestic laws and 
international human rights law,277 the petition urged “the Chinese 
State and Central People’s Government to honor their solemn 
commitment to the people of the world, and ensure the collective right 
to exist of 120 million people.  If we improve the living conditions of 
120 million people, this would be China’s contribution to all of 
humanity.”278 
 The petition contained a number of proposals, some of which 
have since been adopted.  First and foremost, the petition called on 
the State Council to remove HBV from the list of disqualifying 
diseases on the civil service examinations,279 a task realized 
gradually by regulations issued in 2007 and 2010.280  Another 
proposal suggested the protection of privacy rights for HBV 
carriers;281 this proposal subsequently materialized in the 2010 
Notice discussed above.282  Perhaps most importantly, this petition 
served as a template for subsequent requests made to government 
bodies.  Lu Jun, one of China’s leading HBV advocates, has called on 
government bodies to pass various types of protective legislation and 
regulation.283  HBV advocates continue to petition the National 
                                                                                                                      
 274.  See Zhanyou Daqianming Faqi “Weixian Shenchashu” [Droves of Netizens 
Sign “Review of Constitutionality”], XINLANG DUSHU [NEW WAVE READER], Jan. 24, 
2005, http://book.sina.com.cn/longbook/ele/1106534107_zhanshengyigan/54.shtml. 
 275.  A copy of the petition appears on the gandan xiangzhao website. 1611 wei 
Gongming Yaoqiu dui Zhongguo 31 sheng Gonwuyuan Luyong Xianzhi Yigan 
Xiedaizhe Guiding Jinxing Weixian Shengcha he Jiaqiang Yigan Xiedaixhe Lifa 
Baohude Jianyishu [A Petition by 1,611 Citizens to Demand Review of the 
Constitutionality of China’s 31 Provinces’ Regulations Limiting the Hire of Civil 
Servants with the Hepatitis B Virus, and to Strengthen the Legal Protection of Hepatitis 
B Virus Carriers], HEPATITIS B CARRIERS BBS (Nov. 20, 2003, 2:13 PM), 
http://www.hbvhbv.com/forum/thread-298433-1-963.html [hereinafter Petition]. 
 276.  See id. art. II(8) (referring to the example of Zhou Yichao). 
 277.  For instance, the Petition cites Article 33 of the Chinese Constitution 
(equal protection clause), and the first and second chapters of the Labor Law, which 
guarantee inter alia equal employment. Id. 
 278.  Id. art. II(11) (emphasis added). 
 279.  Id. art. III(1). 
 280.  See supra Part III.3.B. 
 281.  Petition, supra note 275, art. III(3). 
 282.  See 2010 Notice, supra note 225, art. II. 
 283.  See Zhao Xiaoqiu, Tamende Fanyigan Qishizhi Zhan [Their Battle Against 
Hepatitis B Discrimination], FALÜ YU SHENGHUO (Apr. 27, 2010), http://focus.news.16 
3.com/10/0427/18/659VUC2900011SM9.html (noting that nine HBV websites 
collectively drafted a petition to protect the employment, education, and privacy rights 
of HBV carriers, which prominent advocate Lu Jun personally delivered to the State 
Council in September 2004, and that Lu Jun delivered similar petitions during the 
annual meetings of the National People’s Congress and the Political Consultative 
Committee in 2005, 2006, and 2007). 
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People’s Congress, the Supreme People’s Court, and various 
ministries to enhance the protections of HBV carriers and 
disadvantaged people more generally.284 
 Upon the success of the gandan xiangzhao website, advocates 
established other websites and organizations to agitate on behalf of 
HBV carriers.  For instance, hbver.com includes a message board, 
news articles about HBV, information about cirrhosis of the liver, and 
links to medicines and prevention methods.285  Another site, 
ganbaobao.com, contains a special section on rights protection, with 
articles on the prevalence of discrimination, news about various 
lawsuits, and advice on how to handle rights infringements.286  
Another legally oriented site is fanqishi.com, which links to articles 
on laws and lawsuits involving various forms of discrimination.287  
These sites continue to play the role of informant and sounding board 
for HBV carriers, allowing people from all over China (and the world) 
to participate in the discussion.  In addition, specialized organizations 
have sprung up to raise awareness, educate citizens, litigate cases, 
and petition government bodies to enhance protections.  The most 
successful of these organizations is probably Yirenping, which 
litigates cases, surveys employer attitudes, publishes a bimonthly 
newsletter with recent developments, and submits petitions to 
government bodies on behalf of HBV carriers.288 
 In society more generally, for the first time, a wider discussion of 
discrimination took place online, both on hepatitis B websites and on 
state-run news agencies such as CCTV.  They debated public safety 
                                                                                                                      
 284.  See Guanyu “Jiuye Cujin Fa” Bufen Tiaokuan Jinxing Sifa Jieshide Jianyi 
[Proposal to Create a Judicial Interpretation for Some Provisions in the “Employment 
Promotion Law”] (on file with author) (proposing to have district courts consider 
hearing employment discrimination cases, distinguish employment discrimination 
cases from labor dispute cases, and order defendants to pay for emotional pain and 
suffering damages when necessary). The petition was sent to the Supreme People’s 
Court in early 2010. See Waidi Canjiren ye Xiang Guangzhoushi Gongjiao Youhui 
[Non-resident Disabled People Also Enjoy Transportation Benefits from Guangzhou 
City], YANGCHENG WANBAO, May 16, 2010, http://www.ycwb.com/ePaper/ycwb/html/ 
2010-05/16/content_829080.htm (noting that 171 disabled people from twenty-five 
provinces signed a petition to the Guangzhou Transportation Commission requesting 
preferential services on Guangzhou public transit). 
 285.  See Zhansheng Yigan [Fighting for Victory], HBVER.COM, 
http://www.hbver.com/Index.html (last visited Apr. 9, 2011) (providing comprehensive 
information for hepatitis B patients including new medical discovery, news, and 
discrimination against hepatitis B carriers). 
 286.  See Ganbaobao [Precious Liver], GANBAOBAO.COM.CN, http://www.ganbao 
bao.com.cn (last visited Apr. 9, 2011). The section on “rights protection by friends of the 
liver” (ganyou weiquan) appears in the lower right hand section of the front page. 
 287.  See generally Anti-Discrimination Laws, FANQISHI.COM, http://www.fanq 
ishi.com (last visited Apr. 9, 2011) (containing hepatitis B discrimination news, cases, 
and statutes against employment discrimination from both China and abroad). 
 288.  See generally Beijing Yi Ren Ping Center, YI REN PING, http://www.yiren 
ping.org (last visited Apr. 9, 2011) (linking to relevant laws and regulations as well as 
reporting Yirenping’s litigation efforts). 
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concerns, legal issues such as the rights to equal employment and 
privacy, and other matters related to hepatitis B.289  HBV came out of 
the closet and onto the tongues and screens of millions of Chinese.  
Significant media attention helped the mobilizing structures keep the 
issue on the public radar. 
 Finally, there is the issue of signification processes.290  How do 
HBV advocates understand their struggle?  What language or 
discourse do they use to frame the debate between carriers and the 
employers who seek to avoid them?  As a socialist country with a long 
history of state-sponsored employment, China privileges social and 
economic rights (such as food, education, social welfare, and 
employment) over civil and political ones.291  In complaints to courts 
of law, signs brandished during demonstrations, and interviews with 
journalists and others, the issue is framed in socioeconomic terms.  
For example, advocates carry signs that state “Eliminate Hepatitis B 
Discrimination—Construct a Harmonious Society,” or “Eliminate 
Hepatitis B Discrimination—Promote Equal Employment,” or even 
“It Is Not Easy to Deprive 120 Million HBV Antigen Carriers of the 
Right to Survive.”292  By framing the issue in terms used by the 
government—such as “harmonious society”—the movement aligns 
itself with government interests and avoids appearing confrontational 
or oppositional.  Instead, they present their cause as one of necessity, 
equality, and the right to a job.  No one is asking for charity or a 
politically sensitive privilege such as the right to vote.  Instead, 
advocates insist that HBV carriers simply want to work, to contribute 
to society, and to live.  No official could cavil about such a platform of 
demands.293 
 By raising public awareness, petitioning for legal reform, and 
mobilizing media support for their cause, activists have made HBV 
discrimination one of China’s leading equality issues.  Their actions 
have helped create a legal foundation from which they can assert 
rights and perhaps change employer behavior.  The success of their 
assertion of rights is taken up in the final section. 
  
                                                                                                                      
 289.  See, e.g., Xiaochu Yigan Qishi [Eliminating Hepatitis Discrimination], 
CCTV (Feb. 18, 2004), http://www.cctv.com/program/jkzlzmb/20040218/100084.shtml 
(transcribing an interview between a CCTV reporter and Tsinghua University’s Yang 
Suiyan). 
 290.  See McAdam et al., supra note 231, at 16–17.  
 291.  ROBERT WEATHERLEY, THE DISCOURSE OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN CHINA 24–25 
(1999). 
 292.  During demonstrations, activists have carried banners with these and 
other slogans. Jiang Yongping, supra note 80. 
 293.  Women’s rights advocates, by contrast, have framed the discussion in terms 
of international human rights law. See generally de Silva de Alwis, supra note 137, at 
207 (noting China’s obligations under international human rights conventions). 
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V. EMPLOYMENT PROMOTION LAW 
 The Employment Promotion Law of 2007 would have helped 
HBV carriers like Zhang Xianzhu and Zhou Yichao.294  Drafting 
began in late 2003,295 perhaps spurred by the public outcry 
surrounding Zhang and Zhou.  Initially, however, the drafters were 
mainly focused on irregularities in China’s labor market, which they 
sought to rectify through training programs, regulation of 
employment agencies, and boosting investment in employment 
services.296  There was particular concern about the oversaturation of 
labor in industries like manufacturing, as well as the lack of technical 
expertise in other industries, such as high-tech fields.297 
 Although these issues were the primary concerns of the National 
People’s Congress (NPC), public comment on an early draft brought to 
light a topic not then on the agenda.  The NPC’s General Office of 
Standing Committee posted a draft of the Employment Promotion 
Law (EPL) on its website from March 25 to April 25, 2007, during 
which time the general public submitted over 11,000 opinions, 7,000 
of which concerned discrimination in employment.298  People 
recounted their personal experiences with discrimination in many 
forms, including sex, age, appearance, and disability 
discrimination.299  Public opposition to discrimination against 
hepatitis B carriers was particularly acute.300  Based on this 
response, the NPC’s Legal Affairs Commission introduced an entirely 
new chapter into the law: Chapter 3, “Equal Employment,” 
systematized the smattering of protections interspersed throughout 
the earlier draft and expanded protections to five groups of 
disadvantaged people.301 
                                                                                                                      
 294.  See Jiuye Cujin Fa [Employment Promotion Law] (promulgated by 
Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Aug. 30, 2007, effective Jan. 1, 2008) art. 30 
(covering infectious disease carriers). But Jiang Tao would not have been covered, since 
the law does not cover height discrimination. 
 295.  China Hopes to Promote Justice in Employment by New Law, CHINA DEV. 
GATEWAY (Mar. 11, 2007), http://www.chinagate.cn/english/social/50373.htm. 
 296.  Id. 
 297.  Tian Chengping, Guanyu “Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Jiuye Cujin Fa 
(Caoan)” de Shuoming [Explanation of the PRC Employment Promotion Law (Draft)], 
in PROMOTION LAW INTERPRETATION, supra note 31, at 219, 220. 
 298.  Liu Bohong, Jiang Xingbie Pingdeng Naru Lifa Guocheng [Incorporating 
Gender Equality into the Process of Making Legislation], in NEW AND EMERGING 
DEVELOPMENTS IN GENDER AND LAW IN CHINA: COMPILATION OF PAPERS AND 
PRESENTATIONS AT THE CHINA GENDER AND LAW EXPERTS CONSULTATION 75, 87 
(Wellesley Ctrs. for Women ed., 2010) [hereinafter EMERGING DEVELOPMENTS]. 
 299.  See PROMOTION LAW INTERPRETATION, supra note 31, at 65. 
 300.  Id. at 81. 
 301.  Jiuye Cujin Fa [Employment Promotion Law] (promulgated by Standing 
Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Aug. 30, 2007, effective Jan. 1, 2008) arts. 25–31   
(containing provisions on gender, ethnicity, the handicapped, carriers of infectious 
diseases, and rural workers in urban areas); Quanguo Renda Falü Weiyuanhui Guanyu 
“Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Jiuye Cujin Fa (Caoan)” Xiugai Qingkuangde Huibao 
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 This process marked an important innovation in the drafting of 
Chinese law.  Since 2005, the NPC has posted draft laws on the 
Internet to solicit feedback from concerned citizens and interest 
groups.302  The experience with the EPL shows that public opinion—
when directed at the right target and conveyed through the proper 
channels—can have an enormous impact on the final form that the 
law takes. 
 Since entering into effect on January 1, 2008, the EPL has 
generated a large number of lawsuits challenging a few types of 
employment discrimination.  Unlike previous guarantees of equality 
in employment, found in such laws as the Labor Law or Women’s 
Law, the EPL grants access to People’s Courts, an invitation that 
many discrimination victims have taken up.303  The following 
subparts discuss the relevant provisions, several representative 
lawsuits, and a number of suggestions for improving the 
implementation of the EPL. 
A.  Provisions 
 The third chapter of the EPL guarantees equal employment, 
providing the most robust set of protections against employment 
discrimination in Chinese law.304  By granting victims of 
discrimination access to courts, the EPL overcomes the common 
critique that Chinese labor law exists solely on paper and rarely leads 
to meaningful implementation.305 
                                                                                                                      
[Report of the NPC Law Committee on the Situation of Revising the “PRC Employment 
Promotion Law (Draft)”], in PROMOTION LAW INTERPRETATION, supra note 31, at 226—
27. An earlier version of the law included age as another prohibited category, but this 
was apparently excised in subsequent decisions. See Jiuye Cujin Fa Caoan: Jianli 
Pingdeng Jiuye Jinzhi Xingbie Qishi [Employment Promotion Law Draft: Establishing 
Equal Employment, Prohibiting Sex Discrimination], CHINA NEWS, Feb. 26, 2007, 
available at http://www.chinacourt.org/html/article/200702/26/235907.shtml. 
 302.  See NPC Invites Public’s Comments on Draft Employment Law, CHINA 
DAILY, Mar. 27, 2007 (noting that the NPC publicized the draft Property Law in 2005 
and the draft Labor Contract Law in 2006). 
 303.  Jiuye Cujin Fa [Employment Promotion Law] (promulgated by Standing 
Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Aug. 30, 2007, effective Jan. 1, 2008) art. 62. 
 304.  Chapter III of the Employment Promotion Law is entitled Equal 
Employment (gongping jiuye). Articles 25–31 provide a wide array of protections, many 
of which are described below. By comparison, Article 12 of the Labor Law protected 
against discrimination in employment due to “nationality, race, sex or religious belief.” 
Laodong Fa [Labor Law] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., 
July 5, 1994, effective Jan. 1, 1995) art. 12. The Labor Law did not protect migrant 
workers or the disabled to the extent of the Employment Promotion Law. Moreover, 
without the access to courts granted by Article 62 of the Employment Promotion Law, 
the Labor Law made it difficult for victims of employment discrimination to 
operationalize the protections of the Labor Law. 
 305.  See, e.g., Ronald C. Brown, China’s Employment Discrimination Laws 
During Economic Transition, 19 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 361, 426 (2006). 
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 The EPL contains a general proscription of employment 
discrimination, mirroring language found in the Labor Law and 
Labor Contract Law.306  More importantly, it provides specific 
prohibitions for five disadvantaged groups: women, ethnic minorities, 
disabled persons, people with infectious diseases, and rural 
workers.307  Unlike U.S. federal law308 or China’s Labor Law,309 
which simply list bases on which it is illegal to discriminate, the EPL 
grants different levels of protection to each group.310  This structure 
allows the EPL to adapt to the existing legal framework and to 
address problems unique to each group.   
 Three provisions in particular—on women, infectious disease 
carriers, and rural residents—are germane to the present discussion.  
Article 27 provides: 
The state ensures that women have labor rights equal to those of men. 
When an employer hires personnel, it may not refuse to employ a 
woman on the basis of her sex, except for jobs or positions that the state 
has specified as being unsuitable to women, or set standards for the 
employment of women that are higher than those for men. 
When an employer hires a female, it may not include provisions in 
her employment contract that place restrictions on her getting 
married, having children, etc.311 
 Although this provision appears to provide robust protections for 
women, scholars have criticized the Employment Promotion Law for 
including the exception for jobs deemed “unsuitable to women.”312  
This exception may encourage employers to classify jobs as 
“unsuitable” for women based on stereotyped or outdated notions of 
women’s capacities, further segregating the workforce and possibly 
pushing women into low-paying jobs.313 
                                                                                                                      
It has been said by some employers in China that labor laws are irrelevant due 
to the unlikely prospect that employees will complain to the authorities or that 
the laws will be enforced. Further, there is little evidence to suggest that either 
the promise of remedies or the threat of penalties enhance enforcement. 
Id. 
 306.  Article 4 echoes Article 12 of the Labor Law, by providing that individuals 
“shall have the right to equal employment and to select their own jobs in accordance 
with the law. The employment of workers shall not be subject to discrimination on the 
basis of such factors as ethnicity, race, sex, religion, etc.” Employment Promotion Law 
art. 4. 
 307.  Id. arts. 27–31. 
 308.  The Civil Rights Act of 1964 proscribed discrimination on an “individual’s 
race, color, religion, sex or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a)(1) (2006). 
 309.  See Labor Law art. 12 (listing prohibited bases of discrimination). 
 310.  Employment Promotion Law arts. 27–31. 
 311.  Id. art. 27. 
 312.  Guo Huimin, Gender-Based Employment Discrimination, in EMERGING 
DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 298, at 90, 95. 
 313.  Id. 
694 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law [Vol. 44:643 
 An additional concern involves the use of the word “hire” in 
section 2 (zhaoyong) and “employ” (luyong) in section 3.314  Women 
face discrimination in various phases and aspects of their jobs, from 
hiring to retirement, promotion, pregnancy leave, wages, and sexual 
harassment.  By using the word “hire,” the law limits its scope to the 
period before the woman becomes an employee.  Although the word 
“employ” in paragraph 3 would seem to dispense with this concern, 
that paragraph only covers terms that appear in the “employment 
contract.”315  An employer is unlikely to indicate that he will sexually 
harass a female employee in the terms of the employment contract.  
In short, the law does not protect women in promotion, training, 
titles, termination, and other phases of employment, as similar laws 
do in Japan316 and the United States.317 
 The Employment Promotion Law also safeguards the rights of 
carriers of infectious disease.  Article 30 provides: 
When hiring personnel, an employer may not refuse to employ someone 
on the grounds that he or she is a carrier of an infectious disease.  
However, a certified carrier of an infectious disease may not, until he or 
she has recovered, or the suspicion of infectiousness has been 
eliminated, engage in work prohibited by laws, administrative statutes 
or the State Council’s health authority, due to the fact that it would 
facilitate the spread of the disease.318 
Again, one could argue that the specification of prohibited jobs may 
reinforce the notion that disease carriers should be excluded from the 
workplace.  However, by requiring employers to base their judgments 
on a certification that the person carries a disease, the role of 
suspicion and misinformation, which occasionally trump sound 
medical reasoning, will be minimized.319  As we shall see in Part V.B, 
this is the most actively litigated provision of the EPL. 
                                                                                                                      
 314.  Employment Promotion Law art. 27. 
 315.  Id. 
 316.  See Megan L. Starich, Comment, The 2006 Revisions to Japan’s Equal 
Employment Opportunity Law: A Narrow Approach to a Pervasive Problem, 16 PAC. 
RIM L. & POL’Y J. 551, 562 (2007) (discussing improvements in Japanese gender 
discrimination law). 
 317.  Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 covers hiring, promotion, discharge, 
pay, fringe benefits, job training, classification, and other aspects of employment. 42 
U.S.C. § 2000e (2006). 
 318.  Employment Promotion Law art. 30. 
 319.  Even in mid-2010, after the passage of the Employment Promotion Law 
and regulations banning the use of HBV tests in hiring, HBV carriers worry that 
employers are uninformed about the law. See generally Jiang Dahong, Yigan Qishi Hai 
Meiyou Tingzhi: Chao Liuchengde Ruzhi Tijian Hai Zai Jiancha [Discrimination 
Against Hepatitis B Still Has Not Stopped: Over Sixty Percent of Medical Examinations 
Still Test for It], RENMIN WANG [PEOPLE’S WEB] (Mar. 24, 2010), http://health.peo 
ple.com.cn/GB/11212873.html (noting that one month after the issuance of the Notice 
on HBV Examinations, less than one-half of government departments interviewed had 
implemented the Notice, and less than 20 percent had received the Notice itself). 
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 Finally, the EPL protects the rights of migrant workers320 by 
providing that “Rural workers employed in cities shall enjoy labor 
rights equal to those of urban workers.  No discriminatory 
restrictions may be set against rural workers seeking employment in 
cities.”321  While this provision addresses a key problem discussed 
above—the plethora of discriminatory restrictions that cities have 
imposed against migrant workers322—it is not clear how the law 
should be implemented.  First, and unlike the above provisions on 
women and carriers of infectious diseases, this article says neither 
that “the state ensures that rural workers have labor rights equal to 
those of urban workers” (as it does for women in Article 27), nor that 
“the state safeguards the labor rights of rural workers” (as it does for 
the disabled in Article 29).323  It thus arguably offers a lower level of 
protection to rural residents than it does to women and carriers of 
infectious diseases. 
 Second, if a migrant worker were to bring a lawsuit based, for 
instance, on a city regulation that favors hiring local residents, 
against whom would he file the case?  The employer who did not hire 
him could simply point to the municipal agency that promulgated the 
discriminatory regulation.  But the agency did not cause the harm—
the employer refused to hire the plaintiff.  Just as in the Zhang 
Xianzhu case, a court could find that the municipal agency exceeded 
its jurisdictional limits or the agency’s actions lacked a factual basis, 
then deem itself powerless to devise a remedy.324  Moreover, a court 
cannot annul a regulation passed by an administrative agency.325  Of 
course, until a migrant worker brings a lawsuit challenging 
discrimination under the EPL, we will have to wait to see how a court 
enforces this provision. 
B.  Cases 
 The twenty-five lawsuits found and analyzed by this author took 
place all over China, in Beijing, Shanghai, Xinjiang, Guangxi, 
                                                                                                                      
 320.  Article 20 also calls on the state “to guide the orderly transition of surplus 
agricultural labor” to urban areas, and on local people’s governments “in both labor-
exporting and labor-importing areas to improve the environment and conditions for 
cities that employ rural laborers.” Employment Promotion Law art. 20. 
 321.  Id. art. 31. 
 322.  See supra notes 163–71 and accompanying text. 
 323.  Employment Promotion Law arts. 27, 29. 
 324.  See ZHOU WEI, supra note 247, at 355–56. The court found that the agency 
lacked factual basis for its actions, but also found the issue moot as the position has 
already been filled. Id. 
 325.  Chinese courts cannot review abstract administrative acts, such as when an 
administrative body passes regulations or orders, but they can review concrete 
administrative acts, such as when an administrative body or its personnel exercises 
administrative authority that targets a specific citizen or legal person. Lin Feng, 
Administrative Law, in INTRODUCTION TO CHINESE LAW, supra note 197, at 75, 76. 
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Zhengzhou, Shenzhen, and many other places.326  The widespread 
use of lawsuits suggests that plaintiffs trust courts to entrust them 
with the adjudication of cases involving basic human rights.327  The 
overwhelming majority of suits—twenty-two of twenty-five—came 
from HBV carriers, a fact that signals both the strength and the 
limitations of the EPL.328  Of the nineteen fully adjudicated cases, 
fifteen resulted in compensation for the plaintiff, while the court 
ruled for the defendant in four cases.329  Many plaintiffs are young 
and college-educated, and the lawsuit involves their first job.330 
 It is important to note that, to date, no plaintiff has filed a 
lawsuit under the EPL for discrimination due to gender, disability, 
ethnicity, or rural status.  In addition, the foregoing analysis is 
limited to lawsuits that appeared in the Chinese media and a small 
number of verdicts that the author obtained through contacting 
human rights lawyers in China.  Because it is difficult to evaluate a 
judge’s reasoning based on a small sample of media reports, the 
analysis is necessarily limited.  Still, basic similarities across many 
cases offer the contours of the typical case. 
 HBV lawsuits follow a pattern, roughly analogous to Zhang 
Xianzhu’s.331  Plaintiff passes the written and oral examinations of 
his prospective employer, who then makes a job offer, possibly 
conditioned on a medical examination.  When the applicant’s medical 
examination reveals that he carries HBV, the employer either rejects 
                                                                                                                      
 326.  See infra Appendix.  
 327.  I have discovered one case brought to a labor arbitration committee, but 
that seems to be the exception. Zhongguo Yiyu Zhenghuanzhe Fanqishi Diyian de Qishi 
[Notice of China’s First Case of Antidiscrimination by Depressive], XINHUA, Aug. 4, 
2008, http://news.xinhuanet.com/focus/2008-08/04/content_8768175.htm. 
 328.  The three other cases involved depression, color-blindness, and a genetic 
blood disorder called thalassemia. “Jiyin Qishi Diyian” Kaiting, Lianxi 1000 Man 
Guangdongren [Hearing for “First Case of Genetic Discrimination,” Affects 10 Million 
Guangdongers], YANGCHENG WANBAO [YANGCHENG EVENINGS NEWS], Feb. 3, 2010, 
http://news.ycwb.com/2010-02/03/content_2421762.htm; Zhongguo Semang Jiuye Qishi 
Diyian Bei Juluzhe Suopei Wuwan Fuweijin [First Case of Employment Discrimination 
Against the Color-Blind in China: Refused Applicant Seeks 50,000 in Damages], 
NANJING MUNICIPAL LEADING GROUP, May 21, 2009, http://www.yfzs.gov.cn/gb/info/ 
alxc/ldaj/2009-02/27/1414169613.html; “Zhongguo Yiyuzheng Huanzhe Fanqishi 
Diyian” de Qishi [Notice on the “First Antidiscrimination Case from a Chinese Person 
Living with Depression”], XINHUA, Aug. 4, 2008, http://www.bj.xinhuanet.com/bjpd-
jdwt/2008-08/04/content_14018937_1.htm. 
 329.  See infra Appendix. 
 330.  See, e.g., infra Appendix case 3 (Li Fei v. Wei Yi Da), case 23 (Du Lan v. 
Changsha Health Department), case 18 (Gong Ping v. Unnamed Defendant). Cases 
where the plaintiff is a college graduate are marked with a “cg” in the Appendix. 
 331.  See, e.g., Guangdong Huizhou Yigan Huanzhe Bei Citui Zhuanggao Qiye 
Suopei Qimanyuan [Guangdong Huizhou: Hepatitis B Sufferer Is Fired and Receives 
70,000 Yuan in Compensation from the Company], GUANGZHOU RIBAO [GUANGZHOU 
DAILY], Aug. 27, 2008; Yigan Qishi Jujue Luren: Danwei Bei Pan Daoqian Jia Peichang 
[Refusing Applicant Due to Hepatitis B Discrimination: Unit Ordered to Apologize and 
Compensate], XINHUA, May 23, 2008, available at http://www.bj.xinhuanet.com/bjpd_ 
sdzx/2008-05/23/content_13349024.htm.  
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the application or rescinds the offer.  After an attempt at mediation, 
the applicant sues in court (avoiding the sidestep of labor 
arbitration332) for economic damages, emotional distress damages, or 
breach of contract.  He or she may also request an apology. 
 Chinese courts have some discretion in deciding whether to 
accept cases.  Some courts refuse to accept cases of discrimination in 
hiring because it is not listed in the Supreme People’s Court’s causes 
of action.333  Nevertheless, many judges have accepted these cases, 
interpreting the disputes as implicating the right to health or the 
right to privacy.334  The first hurdle for many plaintiffs, then, is to 
find a judge or court willing to hear the case. 
 Judges also enjoy discretion in assessing damages from 
emotional distress.335  Based on the limited number of verdicts 
analyzed for this Article, emotional distress seems to be the main 
damage for which judges order compensation.336  Two cases bear this 
out.  In the first case, the plaintiff passed the defendant employer’s 
oral and written examinations during his final year of college, in 
December 2006.337  He then signed an employment agreement (jiuye 
xieyi) and stopped his job search in reliance on that agreement.338  
However, in June 2007, the employer informed the plaintiff that he 
                                                                                                                      
 332.  Labor arbitration is undesirable from a plaintiff’s perspective because it 
tends to favor employers, often because local governments support employers that 
provide jobs and tax revenues for local coffers. See Aaron Halegua, Getting Paid: 
Processing the Labor Disputes of China’s Migrant Workers, 26 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 
254, 265 (2008) (discussing the labor bureau bias in favor of employers). 
 333.  Interview with Liu Minghui, Professor, China Women’s College (Nov. 26, 
2008). The Supreme People’s Court Regulation on Civil Causes of Action does not 
specifically list discrimination as a cause of action. See Minshi Anjian Anyou Guiding 
[Regulations on Civil Causes of Action] (promulgated by the Sup. People’s Ct., Feb. 4, 
2008, effective Apr. 1, 2008)   (failing to include employment discrimination among the 
causes of action listed). 
 334.  Minshi Anjian Anyou Guiding [Regulations on Civil Causes of Action] 
(promulgated by the Sup. People’s Ct., Feb. 4, 2008, effective Apr. 1, 2008) arts. 1, 6, 
163–66   (covering personality rights, the right to privacy, and various labor rights). 
 335.  See Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Queding Minshi Qinquan Jingshen 
Sunhai Peichangren Ruogan Wentide Jieshi [Supreme People’s Court Interpretation of 
Several Issues in Determining the Duty to Compensate for the Tort of Emotional 
Distress] (promulgated by Sup. People’s Ct., Mar. 8, 2001, effective Mar. 10, 2001) art. 
10 (permitting judges to consider the extent of a tortfeasor’s culpability; specific 
circumstances of the methods, situation, or conduct involved; consequences wrought by 
the tort; economic capacities of a tortfeasor; and the average living standards of the 
area where the case is heard). 
 336.  Finding verdicts from Chinese civil litigation is difficult. The existing 
databases have few cases, unlike LEXIS and Westlaw in the United States. After 
several requests from Chinese lawyers and NGOs, the author was able to obtain a 
small sample of five such decisions, two of which are analyzed herein. 
 337.  Plaintiff v. Guangxi Jingui Pulp Co. Ltd., Civ. Dec. No. 312, at 1 (Qinnan 
Dist. People’s Ct., Apr. 29, 2008) (on file with author), aff’d, Civ. Dec. No. 253 (Qinzhou 
Interm. People’s Ct., Oct. 23 2008). To protect the identity of the plaintiff, the name has 
been omitted. 
 338.  Id. 
698 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law [Vol. 44:643 
would need to complete a liver examination, which revealed he 
carried HBV.339  The employer then refused to hire him because he 
carried HBV.340  Indeed, during a conversation that plaintiff actually 
taped and produced as evidence, a member of the company’s human 
resources department explicitly stated that the plaintiff was not hired 
because of the result of his HBV test.341 
 The plaintiff sued for breach of contract, but he also sued in tort, 
alleging that the company’s refusal to hire him violated his right to 
equal employment and caused emotional distress.342  The court 
agreed with both theories but interpreted his suit as a tort claim.343  
It ordered the defendant to pay 10,000 rmb (of the 50,000 rmb 
requested by the plaintiff) in compensation for emotional distress; the 
court cited, among other things, the “the economic capacity of the 
defendant, and the lost work time of the Plaintiff.”344  An appellate 
court upheld this ruling after the defendant appealed.345 
 In a second case, brought against the Dazhong News Group in 
Shandong, the plaintiff passed the written and oral examinations, as 
well as a second-round test.346  The defendant then sent an e-mail 
with a job offer, but the job offer was conditioned on passing a 
medical examination.347  The examination results revealed that the 
plaintiff carried HBV, but her liver functioned normally.348  The 
defendant still refused to sign a contract.349  The plaintiff sued for the 
breach of her right to equal employment, and she appended claims for 
emotional distress and economic damages, as well as an apology.350 
 The court found that the defendant’s rejection “caused Plaintiff 
enormous psychological pressure and emotional pain.  In light of such 
factors as the extent of Defendant’s culpability, the consequences 
wrought by the tort, and the economic capacity for which the 
tortfeasor is responsible, this court comprehensively recognizes 
Plaintiff’s demand for compensation for emotional distress.”351  It 
awarded her 15,000 of the 50,000 rmb that she sought in emotional 
                                                                                                                      
 339.  Id. 
 340.  Id. 
 341.  Id. at 2. 
 342.  Id. 
 343.  Id. at 3. 
 344.  Id. at 4–5. The fact that lost work time was included suggests that this was 
not simply a decision based on emotional distress, but rather on the economic losses 
stemming from not having a job. 
 345.  Plaintiff v. Guangxi Jingui Pulp Industrial Co. Ltd., Civ. Dec. No. 253, at 4 
(Qinzhou Interm. People’s Ct., Oct. 23, 2008). 
 346.  Plaintiff v. Dazhong News Group, Civ. Dec. No. 3972, at 4 (Lixia Dist. 
People’s Ct., Jan. 23, 2009) (on file with author). 
 347.  Id. at 1. 
 348.  Id. at 2. 
 349.  Id. at 4. 
 350.  Id. at 3. 
 351.  Id. at 7. 
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distress damages.352  She also requested half a year’s wages, or 
12,894 rmb, in economic damages to make up for the time lost 
between the defendant’s refusal to hire her and her filing of the 
lawsuit.353  The court awarded a fraction of the damages sought—
1,000 rmb—in light of her “work and life circumstances.”354  Finally, 
the court ordered the defendant to issue a public apology, to be 
authorized by the court, within thirty days of the issuance of the 
judgment.355 
 The above cases suggest the broad contours of HBV litigation.  
The key to success in these lawsuits—as in discrimination cases in 
the United States—is the adduction of proof.  Unlike American 
litigants, Chinese plaintiffs cannot shift the burden of proof to 
defendants in discrimination cases; they must produce all the 
necessary documentation themselves.356  Luckily for carriers of HBV, 
there is often a long paper trail, something comparatively rare in 
other discrimination cases.  These documents provide the evidentiary 
basis that judges need to determine that the defendant 
discriminated.357  Plaintiffs may produce notices from the employer 
that they passed the written and oral examinations, copies of job 
offers (or conditional job offers), and other indicia that they qualified 
for the position.  They may also have a copy of the employer’s request 
to sit for a medical examination, as well as the results of that exam.  
Finally, a written rejection, conversation, or phone call (sometimes 
recorded) encapsulates the rejection.  From all of this evidence, judges 
have a solid foundation upon which to make a finding of 
discrimination. 
 However, a long paper trail will not arise under most other kinds 
of discrimination.  In gender discrimination cases, women can be 
                                                                                                                      
 352.  Id. 
 353.  Id. 
 354.  Id. Though not a large amount, economic damages augmented her recovery 
and enlarged the cognizable scope of damages for employment discrimination. From 
the opinion, it is not clear what plaintiff’s life and work conditions were. 
 355.  Id. 
 356.  China does permit the reversal of burden of proof, but only in limited 
circumstances such as products liability or medical malpractice.  Zuigao Renmin 
Fayuan Guanyu Minshi Susong Zhengjude Ruogan Guiding [Several Rules of the 
Supreme People’s Court on Evidence in Civil Procedures] (promulgated Dec. 21, 2001, 
effective Apr. 1, 2002) art. 4(6), (8), translated in CIVIL PROCEDURE LAW & COURT 
RULES OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 243, 245 (Wei Luo trans., 1997). In all 
other suits, the plaintiff is responsible for producing the relevant evidentiary 
materials. Id. art. 1. As of October 2010, there is no law, regulation, or interpretation 
that permits a plaintiff in an employment discrimination lawsuit to reverse the burden 
of proof. Id. 
 357.  In many verdicts, judges write at length about the quality and reliability of 
the evidence presented. See, e.g., infra Appendix (Plaintiff v. Dushi Zhongsheng 
Adver.). The court spends most of the ten-page opinion analyzing the credibility of both 
parties’ evidence. Plaintiff v. Dushi Zhongsheng Adver., at 2–3 (Jianghan Dist. People’s 
Ct. Dec. 18, 2008) (on file with author) (categorizing the evidence into four kinds); id. at 
4–9 (evaluating the evidence). 
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screened out much earlier in the process.  A résumé may reveal the 
applicant’s gender, either because of her given name or the 
photograph that often accompanies the application packet.  If there is 
still doubt, a phone call can ferret out female applicants, and even if a 
phone call fails, the employer can simply interview the female 
candidate and turn her down without generating any indicia of 
discrimination.  With the exception of explicit job advertisements,358 
none of the discriminatory techniques discussed in this Article would 
produce documentation, and this lack of documentation leaves a 
judge to rule primarily on the plaintiff’s allegations, suspicions, and 
interpretations.  Even if the defendant made a plainly discriminatory 
statement during the interview, or injected discrimination obliquely 
by asking about boyfriends and children, the case would still hinge on 
hearsay: her word against his.  This presents a dilemma for the 
presiding judge. 
 Therefore, it is not entirely surprising that no Chinese woman, to 
this author’s knowledge, has filed a lawsuit based on gender 
discrimination in hiring.359  This absence can be explained in various 
ways, including the lack of evidence noted above.  Some women 
simply accept the prevalence of sex discrimination and adopt an 
attitude of anger, resignation, and silence, the latter perceived as the 
most effective of the “reasonable alternatives.”360  Others are too 
concerned with finding a job; they lack the time and resources needed 
to prosecute a lawsuit.361  As one interviewee put it, “Even if I won 
the case, what kind of result would I get?  Is the employer going to 
hire me?  If a company didn’t want to hire you, but you get the job 
[after litigation], they are not going to make it easy for you.”362  
Particularly in light of the success of various hepatitis B cases, the 
                                                                                                                      
 358.  To my knowledge, no woman has sued for the explicit gender divisions in 
any newspaper or Internet advertisement. 
 359.  Women have sued for various aspects of employment discrimination, 
including sexual harassment, termination due to pregnancy, early retirement, and 
termination after one’s husband is terminated. But these cases all involve conduct after 
plaintiff has been hired. See generally FUNÜ QUANYI YU GONGYI SUSONG [WOMEN’S 
RIGHTS & PUBLIC INTEREST LITIGATION] (Guo Jianmei & Li Ying eds., 2008) (describing  
over a dozen lawsuits brought by the Center for Women’s Law & Legal Services of 
Peking University, the leading women’s rights NGO in China); see also Zao Jiuye 
Qishi, Weihe Weijian Nüxing Suzhe Falü [After Encountering Discrimination, Why 
Have We Not Seen Women Appeal to the Law?], XINJINGBAO [NEW CAPITAL NEWS], June 
15, 2009, http://www.chinanews.com.cn/edu/edu‐jysp/news/2009/06‐15/1734017.shtml 
(noting that, as of June 15, 2009, not a single case of gender discrimination in hiring 
had been filed). Also note that recent searches on Google and Baidu revealed no 
discrimination cases brought by women (last checked Apr. 19, 2011). 
 360.  See Zhao Li, Huiwang Jiuye Cujin Fa Shishi Yinian: Weijuli Jiujing You 
Duo Qiang [Reflecting on One Year of Implementation of the Employment Promotion 
Law: How Strong Is the Deterrence?], FAZHIWANG [RULE OF LAW WEBSITE] (Mar. 11, 
2009), http://www.procedurallaw.cn/fzrd/200903/t20090311_191813.html. 
 361.  Id. 
 362.  Id. 
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absence of sex discrimination lawsuits calls into question the efficacy 
of the EPL as a tool to combat employment discrimination. 
C.  Problems 
 For all of its important advances, the Employment Promotion 
Law omits a few basic necessities.  These gaps could be filled through 
subsequent legislation, provincial legislation, implementing 
guidelines, administrative regulations, or judicial interpretations.  
This section offers some suggestions to heighten the efficacy of 
China’s antidiscrimination laws generally and the EPL in particular. 
 First, the EPL does not define discrimination.  This may seem 
like a formality, but the concept of discrimination is not widely known 
in China, including among judges.363  Consequently, formalities like a 
clear definition of discrimination can make a big difference to the 
presiding judge. 
 Second, the EPL does not cover a wide range of discrimination 
that is quite common in contemporary China.  Marital status, 
appearance, and height are routine bases for refusing to hire 
someone,364 even though they have almost no bearing on the ability to 
perform.  To be sure, it is unreasonable to expect antidiscrimination 
law to respond perfectly to contemporary conditions ab initio, 
particularly given the slow and gradual development of Chinese legal 
reform, which prefers minor and incremental change to cataclysm.  
Moreover, as experience in other countries shows, protected classes 
tend to proliferate over time; in a few years, it is likely that a new 
group, currently unrecognized, may clamor for their rights more 
loudly or persuasively.365  For example, during the drafting of the 
EPL, a number of public commentators pointed out the prevalence of 
age discrimination.366  The decision not to include age discrimination 
may be tied to the prevalence of the differential retirement age for 
men and women, which has been a heated source of debate in recent 
years.367 
                                                                                                                      
 363.  Interview with Li Cheng, antidiscrimination lawyer and doctoral candidate, 
Shanghai Jiaotong University (Mar. 15, 2009). 
 364.  See Zhu Zhe, Bias Is a ‘Way of Life in Jobs,’ CHINA DAILY, Jan. 8, 2007, 
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2007-01/08/content_776547.htm. 
 365.  The United States first protected race, sex, color, religion, and national 
origin in the 1964 Civil Rights Act; age in the 1967 Age Discrimination in Employment 
Act; and disability in the 1990 Americans with Disability Act. See Federal Laws 
Prohibiting Discrimination: Questions and Answers, EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY 
COMM’N (Nov. 29, 2009), http://www.eeoc.gov/facts/qanda.html (outlining 
antidiscrimination laws). 
 366.  See PROMOTION LAW INTERPRETATION, supra note 31, at 65. 
 367.  See, e.g., Chen Zhili Urges Gender Equality in Retirement Age, NAT’L 
PEOPLE’S CONG. OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (Apr. 6, 2009), 
http://www.npc.Gov.cn/englishnpc/news/Events/2009-04/06/content_1496720.htm 
(noting that Ms. Chen, a senior legislator in the NPC Standing Committee, expressed 
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 Third, the protections offered are not as robust as they could be.  
As already discussed, discriminatory job advertisements are common, 
and interviewers routinely ask women personal questions about 
marriage and childbirth plans.368  Indeed, some employers still 
require women to forego pregnancy for many years as a condition of 
employment.369  A legal prohibition on gender restrictions in print 
and online advertisements would be a good first step, followed by the 
proscription of personal questions in interviews. 
 Fourth, the law does not address the evidentiary issues that 
typically emerge in employment discrimination lawsuits.  In the 
United States, plaintiffs frequently struggle to adduce evidence of 
discrimination, which is almost exclusively within the defendant’s 
possession.370  The Supreme Court responded to this lacuna with the 
McDonnell-Douglas burden-shifting mechanism: after the plaintiff 
makes a prima facie showing of employment discrimination, the 
burden shifts to the defendant to articulate a nondiscriminatory 
reason for its decision; if the defendant meets that burden, the 
burden shifts back to the plaintiff to prove why the defendant’s 
proffered reason is pretextual.371  To be sure, burden-shifting has 
attracted its own set of critics,372 but it has leveled the evidentiary 
playing field between defendants, who are loath to turn over 
information behind their employment decisions, and plaintiffs, who 
must rely on stray comments or other circumstantial evidence to 
prove their case. 
                                                                                                                      
support for Beijing to change the law on retirement ages, calling the current system “a 
terrible waste of human resources, particularly for those who have doctorates or 
master’s degrees”); Nüganbu Wantui Tiaokuan Bei Cechu [Provision on Later 
Retirement for Female Candidates Removed], BEIJING NEWS, May 5, 2005, 
http://news.cctv.com/society/20090505/107566.shtml (noting that the Beijing 
government decided to withdraw the issue of changing the age from further 
discussion). 
 368.  See supra Part II.C. 
 369.  de Silva de Alwis, supra note 137, at 233. 
 370.  See LEWIS, & NORMAN, supra note 35, at 167–68 (“Unsurprisingly, outside 
the realm of policies that discriminate by their clear terms on the basis of a protected 
characteristic, cases presenting smoking-gun exemplars of ‘direct,’ ‘express,’ or ‘facial’ 
evidence are relative rarities.”). 
 371.  McDonnell-Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 807 (1973). 
 372.  See generally Denny Chin & Jodi Golinsky, Employment Discrimination: 
Moving Beyond McDonnell-Douglas: A Simplified Method for Assessing Evidence in 
Discrimination Cases, 64 BROOK L. REV. 659 (1998) (attacking the McDonnell-Douglas 
burden shifting framework). The authors suggest that burden-shifting distracts judges 
from focusing on the “ultimate question,” namely, whether it is more likely than not 
that the employer engaged in discrimination. Id. at 678. They propose instead that 
judges at the summary judgment stage first weigh plaintiff’s evidence, second weigh 
defendant’s evidence that it did not discriminate, and third view the evidence 
holistically, drawing all reasonable inferences in plaintiff’s favor. Id. at 674–78. If the 
evidence passes these three stages, the case is ready for a jury trial. Id. at 677–78. 
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 Fifth, the law does not address the question of legal liability, and 
remedies in particular, with sufficient specificity.373  Suppose that the 
plaintiff proves that her job application was turned down for a 
discriminatory reason.  What should her redress be?  Does she get the 
job?  Does she get the next available job?  Should she receive another 
form of injunctive relief?  And what remedial or punitive measures 
should courts levy against discriminating employers?  Some scholars 
have suggested that employers should have to either withdraw 
discriminatory advertisements or lose the ability to advertise 
altogether.374  As for punitive measures, these scholars recommend a 
number of sanctions, including civil liability, to cover economic losses 
and emotional distress damages to the plaintiff; administrative 
liability, such as a fine from the employer to the relevant enforcement 
agency; and even criminal liability.375  These alternative forms of 
liability could take the form of implementing legislation from the 
Ministry of Labor and Social Services or a judicial interpretation by 
the Supreme People’s Court. 
 The EPL could have taken a page from the 2007 Labor Contract 
Law, Section VII of which lays out various situations that a judge 
may face in presiding over a case.376  Because of Section VII, a judge 
knows what to do if, for example, an employer fails to set out 
mandatory clauses in the labor contract,377 retains the employee’s ID 
card or seizes his property,378 or does not certify the termination of a 
labor contract.379  The EPL does not reach this level of specificity.  As 
                                                                                                                      
 373.  Zhou Huyong, Jiuye Qishi Susong Jiuji Tixi de Goujian [Components of a 
Redress System for Employment Discrimination Litigation], 23 BEIJINGSHI GONGHUI 
GANBU XUEYUAN XUEBAO [J. OF BEIJING FED’N OF TRADE UNIONS CADRE C.] 42, 42 
(2008). 
 374.  Zhang Huagui & Guo Yiyi, Lun Jiuye Xingbie Qishide Falü Guizhi: 
Jianping “Jiuye Cujin Fa” zhi Xiangguan Guiding [On Legal Regulations of Sex 
Discrimination in Employment: A Critique of the Relevant Provisions in the 
“Employment Promotion Law”], 167 FAZHI YU JINGJI [L. & ECON.] 33, 34 (2008). The 
authors suggest that discriminating employers should bear both remedial 
(buchangxing) responsibility and punitive (zhengfaxing) responsibility. Id. at 34. The 
former would permit the appropriate government agency to make employers withdraw 
discriminatory requirements, such as “men only” or “men preferred.” The latter could 
consist of civil, administrative, or criminal punishments to be used when the remedial 
responsibility could not make a plaintiff whole. Id. 
 375.  Id. Criminal liability, which would require revision of the criminal code, is 
unlikely, though countries like France have criminalized some forms of racial 
discrimination. See generally Julie C. Suk, Equal by Comparison: Unsettling 
Assumptions About Discrimination Law, 55 AM. J. COMP. L. 295, 302–03, 309–11 (2006) 
(describing French criminal sanctions for discrimination and the history of sanctions on 
discriminatory speech in particular). 
 376.  See Laodong Hetong Fa [Labor Contract Law] (promulgated by the 
Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., June 29, 2007, effective Jan. 1, 2008), ch. VII   
(detailing the situations in which an employer is liable). 
 377.  Id. art. 81. 
 378.  Id. art. 84. 
 379. Id. art. 89. 
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a result, additional regulations by other government organs are 
needed. 
 Sixth, a problem as widespread as employment discrimination 
requires the coordinated efforts of courts, labor bureaus, local people’s 
congresses, and other official actors.  The EPL tasks certain 
government organs with eliminating discrimination, but only in 
vague terms.  For instance, Article 25 provides that “People’s 
Governments at every level shall create a fair employment 
environment, eliminate discrimination in employment, formulate 
policies and take measures to support and assist the hard-to-
employ.”380  But local governments are busy entities, more likely 
concerned with creating jobs than assisting those who have been 
refused.  Given their mandate to increase GDP and economic growth, 
local governments may hesitate to formulate such a policy, 
particularly if it might antagonize employers who practice 
employment discrimination. 
 Similarly, Article 60 provides that “Labor administration 
authorities shall supervise and inspect the implementation of this 
Law, establish a reporting system, accept reports of violations of this 
Law and promptly verify and handle the same.”381  This provision is 
more specific, but the author is not aware of a single labor bureau 
that has set up a reporting system.  Such a body is certainly 
necessary, however; like the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission in the United States, it could handle cases, monitor job 
advertisements, and investigate employers against whom charges 
have been directed.  As it stands now, many forms of employment 
discrimination go unpunished, while job advertisements help to 
segregate workspaces based on age, gender, and physical appearance. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
 Employment discrimination is now firmly imprinted in the 
national psyche of the PRC.  Famous cases have captured headlines 
and public attention.  NGOs dedicated to various causes have been 
formed, raising awareness, suing offenders, conducting research, and 
even training employers about the problems of discrimination.  A 
consensus is forming that discrimination—though widespread—is 
wrong.  By passing the Employment Protection Law in 2007, the 
national government took its largest step toward ensuring equal 
employment.  Plaintiffs have won a handful of well-publicized cases, 
suggesting that courts view the law favorably, and the media has the 
government’s blessing to report on employment discrimination.  
                                                                                                                      
 380.  Jiuye Cujin Fa [Employment Promotion Law] (promulgated by the 
Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Aug. 30, 2007, effective Jan. 1, 2008) art. 25. 
 381.  Id. art. 60. 
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Moreover, the long-discussed implementation deficit of Chinese law is 
shrinking, if only slightly. 
 If the Chinese government continues to advance these reforms, it 
will first have to revise a thicket of discriminatory legislation.  Most 
likely, this revision process will be piecemeal, reflecting recent 
gradualist trends, as well as the general nature of Chinese legal 
reform.  Or it could be achieved through an all-encompassing law, 
such as a new antidiscrimination law.  Regardless, the government 
will have to chart new ground, resolving the evidentiary issues that 
the Employment Promotion Law does not address, reviewing the 
publication of discriminatory advertisements, explaining what kinds 
of remedies are available to successful plaintiffs, and perhaps even 
establishing a body to monitor employment discrimination.  This 
short history of employment discrimination in China shows that 
proscription is always a work in progress.  China has taken the first 
steps down the righteous path of prohibiting discrimination.  
Presumably, popular support for these initiatives will continue. 
 Finally, this Article demonstrates that Chinese citizens, with the 
assistance of civil society groups and online technologies, can 
effectuate legal change in a gradual, small-scale way.  It remains to 
be seen how well this lesson can be applied to other areas of potential 
legal reform, but the EPL proves that the energies and activism of a 
small, committed group of people can change the law, even in 
democratically challenged contemporary China. 
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APPENDIX – HBV Litigation (unless otherwise noted) 
 
# Verdict 
Plaintiff’s 
status Defendant Dist. Ct., Place 
Remedy: 
unknown 
1 10/4/07 CHEN Long Chang Shuo 
Tech Co. 
Nanhui, Shanghai D voluntarily 
offered 5k 
2 10/14/07 LI Sheng Nokia Dongguan, GD P could not 
verify voice 
3 1/4/08 LI Fei, cg Dongguan Wei Yi 
Da 
Dongguan, GD 24k ec; D 
promised not to 
discriminate 
4 3/25/08 ZHANG Lihong Beijing Duoqi Qiye 
Consulting Co. 
Chaoyang, BJ Sought 50k 
5 5/24/08 GAO Jun Bide Telecom Co. Chaoyang, BJ 17k ec, 2k emo, 
apology 
6 7/19/08 YUAN Ye, cg Jabil Elec. Unknown Undisclosed 
settlement 
7 8/5/08 YUAN Yipeng 
(depression) 
IBM Shanghai Pudong LAC, SH Reinstated 
labor K, 57k in 
lost wages 
8 8/27/08 WANG An Hongku Elec. Huizhou, GD 5k emo, 
apology 
9 10/25/08 XU Jianguo, cg Guangxi Jingui 
Pulp Ltd. 
Qinnan, Qinzhou 1st: 10k emo, 
2nd:  10k emo 
10 11/3/08 A Gang Unnamed Co. Nanning Sought 30k in 
ec 
11 12/9/08 WANG Xiaoguo, 
cg 
Mai Ke Wei Er Air 
Con 
Longgang, 
Shenzhen 
Sought 65k in 
ec & emo, 
apology 
12 12/10/08 TAO Ming Jiangxi Province 
Chil’s Hosp. 
Nanchang, Jiangxi Annulled D’s 
rejection 
13 12/18/08 LIANG Qi, 25 Dushi Zhongsheng 
Adver. 
Wuhan, Hubei 5k emo, 
apology 
14 1/23/09 ZHANG Yun, 21 Dazhong Daily 
News 
Lixia, Jinan 15K emo, 1k ec, 
apology 
15 2/27/09 ZENG Lei 25 cg 
(colorblind) 
Henan Province 
Rural Credit 
Union 
Jinshui, Zhengzhou Sought 3k 
ec,50k emo, 
apology, job 
16 5/4/09 LI Wen, 23, cg Unnamed Tech. 
Co. 
Luogang 
Guangzhou 
20k settlement 
17 5/29/09 WANG Zhuo, 24, 
MS 
Unnamed Eng.  
SOE 
Chengguan, 
Lanzhou 
15k settlement 
18 6/15/09 GONG Ping, cg Unnamed Cable 
Co. 
Urumqi, Xinjiang 1st: 0, 2nd: 18k 
settlement 
19 7/9/09 YU Lihua, cg Shenzhen 
Development Bank 
Luohu, Shenzhen 3k ec, 325 for 
tests, 30 for 
transport costs 
20 10/9/09 GUO Lin, 25, cg Fushikang Group 
Elec. 
Jianggan, 
Hangzhou 
5k settlement 
privacyy viol 
21 1/8/10 XIAO Qi Provincial 
Testing Ctr. 
Yunyan, Guiyang 1st: 0, 2nd: 0 
22 1/14/10 TANG, XIE, 
ZHOU 
Foshan Dep’t of 
H.R. 
Chancheng, Foshan 1st: 0, 2nd: 
ongoing 
23 1/25/10 DU Lan Changsha 
Ministry Health 
Yuelu, Changsha 1st: 0 
24 3/5/10 CHEN Ling Dechang Elec. Baoan, Shenzhen 1st: 0, 2nd: 3k 
in emo 
25 3/11/10 WANG Li Taipingyang Prop. 
Ins. 
Tianhe, Guangzhou 8k emo 
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*Prevailing party in bold (plaintiff in bold if the case settled because 
he or she received compensation) 
**Abbreviations: cg: college graduate; ec: economic damages; emo: 
emotional distress damages; apology: court ordered defendant to 
publish written apology 
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